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Abstract
We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the proba-
bilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences.
We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of decay of
the probability that the sample path of the evolutionary process lies in a prespecified
set as the population size approaches infinity. We use these results to describe excur-
sion rates and stationary distribution asymptotics in settings where the mean dynamic
admits a globally attracting state, and we compute these rates explicitly for the case
of logit choice in potential games.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory concerns the dynamics of aggregate behavior of populations
of strategically interacting agents. To define these dynamics, one specifies the population
size N, the game being played, and the revision protocol agents follow when choosing
new actions. Together, these objects define a Markov chain XN over the set of population
states—that is, of distributions of agents across actions.
From this common origin, analyses of evolutionary game dynamics generally proceed
in one of two directions. One possibility is to consider deterministic dynamics, which
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describe the evolution of aggregate behavior using an ordinary differential equation.
More precisely, a deterministic evolutionary dynamic is a map that assigns population games
to dynamical systems on the set of population states. The replicator dynamic (Taylor
and Jonker (1978)), the best response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui (1991)), and the logit
dynamic (Fudenberg and Levine (1998)) are prominent examples.
In order to derive deterministic dynamics from the Markovian model of individual
choice posited above, one can consider the limiting behavior of the Markov chains as
the population size N approaches infinity. Kurtz (1970), Benaı¨m (1998), Benaı¨m and
Weibull (2003, 2009), and Roth and Sandholm (2013) show that if this limit is taken,
then over any finite time span, it becomes arbitrarily likely that the Markov chain is
very closely approximated by solutions to a differential equation—the mean dynamic—
defined by the Markov chain’s expected increments. Different revision protocols generate
different deterministic dynamics: for instance, the replicator dynamic can be obtained
from a variety of protocols based on imitation, while the best response and logit dynamics
are obtained from protocols based on exact and perturbed optimization, respectively.1
These deterministic dynamics describe typical behavior in a large population, specifying
how the population settles upon a stable equilibrium, a stable cycle, or a more complex
stable set. They thus provide theories of how equilibrium behavior is attained, or of how
it may fail to be attained.
At the same time, if the process XN is ergodic—for instance, if there is always a small
chance of a revising player choosing any available action—then any stable state or other
stable set of the mean dynamic is only temporarily so: equilibrium must break down,
and new equilibria must emerge. Behavior over very long time spans is summarized
by the stationary distribution of the process. This distribution is typically concentrated
near a single stable set, the identity of which is determined by the relative probabilities of
transitions between stable sets.
This last question is the subject of the large literature on stochastic stability under evo-
lutionary game dynamics.2 The most commonly employed framework in this literature is
that of Kandori et al. (1993) and Kandori and Rob (1995, 1998). These authors consider a
population of fixed size, and suppose that agents employ the best response with mutations
rule: with high probability a revising agent plays an optimal action, and with the com-
plementary probability chooses a action uniformly at random. They then study the long
1For imitative dynamics, see Helbing (1992), Weibull (1995), Bjo¨rnerstedt and Weibull (1996), Hofbauer
(1995), and Schlag (1998); for exact and perturbed best response dynamics, see Roth and Sandholm (2013)
and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007), respectively. For surveys, see Sandholm (2010b, 2015).
2Key early contributions include Foster and Young (1990), Kandori et al. (1993), and Young (1993); for
surveys, see Young (1998) and Sandholm (2010b).
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run behavior of the stochastic game dynamic as the probability of mutation approaches
zero. The assumption that all mistakes are equally likely makes the question of equilib-
rium breakdown simple to answer, as the unlikelihood of a given sample path depends
only on the number of suboptimal choices it entails. This eases the determination of the
stationary distribution, which is accomplished by means of the well-known Markov chain
tree theorem.3
To connect these two branches of the literature, one can consider the questions of
equilibrium breakdown and stochastic stability in the large population limit, describing
the behavior of the processes XN when this behavior differs substantially from that of the
mean dynamic. Taking a key first step in this direction, this paper establishes a sample
path large deviation principle: for any prespecified set of sample paths Φ of a fixed duration,
we characterize the rate of decay of the probability that the sample path of XN lies in
Φ as N grows large. This large deviation principle is the basic preliminary to obtaining
characterizations of the expected waiting times before transitions between equilibria and
of stationary distribution asymptotics.
As we noted earlier, most work in stochastic evolutionary game theory has focused
on evolution under the best response with mutations rule, and on properties of the small
noise limit. In some contexts, it seems more realistic to follow the approach taken here, in
which the probabilities of mistakes depend on their costs.4 Concerning the choice of limits,
Binmore and Samuelson (1997) argue that the large population limit is more appropriate
than the small noise limit for most economic modeling. However, the technical demands
of this approach have restricted previous analyses to the two-action case.5 This paper
provides a necessary first step toward obtaining tractable analyses of large population
limits in many-action environments.
In order to move from the large deviation principle to statements about the long run
behavior of the stochastic process, one can adapt the analyses of Freidlin and Wentzell
(1998) of diffusions with vanishing noise parameters to our setting of sequences of Markov
chains running on increasingly fine grids in the simplex. In Section 4, we explain how
the large deviation principle can be used to estimate the waiting times to reach sets of
states away from an attractor and to describe the asymptotic behavior of the stationary
distribution in cases where the mean dynamic admits a globally attracting state. We
prove that when agents playing a potential game make decisions using the logit choice
3See Freidlin and Wentzell (1998, Lemma 6.3.1) or Young (1993, Theorem 4).
4Important early work featuring this assumption includes the logit model of Blume (1993, 1997) and
the probit model of Myatt and Wallace (2003). For more recent work and references, see Sandholm (2007,
2010a), Staudigl (2012), and Sandholm and Staudigl (2016).
5See Binmore et al. (1995), Binmore and Samuelson (1997), Blume (1993), and Sandholm (2007, 2010a).
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rule, the control problems in the statement of the large deviation principle can be solved
explicitly. We illustrate the implications of these results by using them to characterize
long run behavior in a model of traffic congestion.
Our work here is closely connected to developments in two branches of the stochastic
processes literature. Large deviation principles for environments quite close to those
considered here have been established by Azencott and Ruget (1977), Dupuis (1988), and
Dupuis and Ellis (1997). In these works, the sequences of processes under consideration
are defined on open sets in Rn, and have transition laws that allow for motion in all
directions from every state. These results do not apply directly to the evolutionary
processes considered here, which necessarily run on a compact set. Thus relative to these
works, our contribution lies in addressing behavior at and near boundary states.
There are also close links to work on interacting particle systems with long range
interactions. In game-theoretic terms, the processes studied in this literature describe
the individual choices of each of N agents as they evolve in continuous time, with the
stochastic changes in each agent’s action being influenced by the aggregate behavior of
all agents. Two large deviation principles for such systems are proved by Le´onard (1995).
The first describes large deviations of the sequence of probability distributions on the
set of empirical distributions, where the latter distributions anonymously describe the N
agents’ sample paths through the finite set of actions A = {1, . . .n}.6 The second describes
large deviations of the sequence the probability distributions over paths on discrete grids
X N in the n-simplex, paths that represent the evolution of aggregate behavior in the N
agent particle system.7 The Freidlin-Wentzell theory for particle systems with long range
interactions has been developed by Borkar and Sundaresan (2012), who provide many
further references to this literature.
The large deviation principle we prove here is a discrete-time analogue of the second
result of Le´onard (1995) noted above. Unlike Le´onard (1995), we allow individuals’ transi-
tion probabilities to depend in a vanishing way on the population size, as is natural in our
game-theoretic context (see Examples 2.1–2.4 below). Also, our discrete-time framework
obviates the need to address large deviations in the arrival of revision opportunities.8 But
6In more detail, each sample path of the N agent particle system specifies the action i ∈ A played by
each agent as a function of time t ∈ [0,T]. Each sample path generates an empirical distribution DN over
the set of paths I = {ι : [0,T]→ A}, where with probability one, DN places mass 1N on N distinct paths in I .
The random draw of a sample path of the particle system then induces a probability distribution PN over
empirical distributions DN on the set of paths I . The large deviation principle noted above concerns the
behavior of the probability distributions PN as N grows large.
7In parlance of the particle systems literature, the first result is concerns the “empirical distributions” (or
“empirical measures”) of the system, while the latter concerns the “empirical process”.
8Under a continuous-time process, the number of revision opportunities received by N agents over a
short but fixed time interval [t, t + dt] follows a Poisson distribution with mean N dt. As the population size
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the central advantage of our approach is its simplicity. Describing the evolution of the
choices of each of N individual agents requires a complicated stochastic processes. Un-
derstanding the proofs (and even the statements) of large deviation principles for these
processes requires substantial background knowledge. Here our interest is in aggregate
behavior. By making the aggregate behavior process our primitive, we are able to state
our large deviation principle with a minimum of preliminaries. Likewise, our proof of
this principle, which follows the weak convergence approach of Dupuis and Ellis (1997),
is relatively direct, and in Section 5 we explain its main ideas in a straightforward manner.
These factors may make the work to follow accessible to researchers in economics, biology,
engineering, and other fields.
This paper is part of a larger project on large deviations and stochastic stability under
evolutionary game dynamics with payoff-dependent mistake probabilities and arbitrary
numbers of actions. In Sandholm and Staudigl (2016), we considered the case of the small
noise double limit, in which the noise level in agents’ decisions is first taken to zero, and
then the population size to infinity. The initial analysis of the small noise limit concerns
a sequence of Markov chains on a fixed finite state space; the relevant characterizations
of large deviations properties in terms of discrete minimization problems are simple and
well-known. Taking the second limit as the population size grows large turns these
discrete minimization problems into continuous optimal control problems. We show that
the latter problems possess a linear structure that allows them to be solved analytically.
The present paper begins the analysis of large deviations and stochastic stability when
the population size is taken to infinity for a fixed noise level. This analysis concerns a
sequence of Markov chains on ever finer grids in the simplex, making the basic large
deviations result—our main result here—considerably more difficult than its small-noise
counterpart. Future work will provide a full development of Freidlin-Wentzell theory for
the large population limit, allowing for mean dynamics with multiple stable states. It will
then introduce the second limit as the noise level vanishes, and determine the extent to
which the agreement of the two double limits agree. Further discussion of this research
agenda is offered in Section 4.3.
grows large, the number of arrivals per agent over this interval becomes almost deterministic. However,
a large deviation principle for the evolutionary process must account for exceptional realizations of the
number of arrivals. For a simple example illustrating how random arrivals influence large deviations
results, see Dembo and Zeitouni (1998, Exercise 2.3.18).
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2. The Model
We consider a model in which all agents are members of a single population. The
extension to multipopulation settings only requires more elaborate notation.
2.1 Finite-population games
We consider games in which the members of a population of N agents choose actions
from the common finite action set A = {1, . . . ,n}. We describe the population’s aggregate
behavior by a population state x, an element of the simplex X = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}, or
more specifically, the grid X N = X ∩ 1NZn = {x ∈ X : Nx ∈ Zn}. The standard basis vector
ei ∈ X ⊂ Rn represents the pure population state at which all agents play action i.
We identify a finite-population game with its payoff function FN : X N → Rn, where
FNi (x) ∈ R is the payoff to action i when the population state is x ∈ X N.
Example 2.1. Matching in normal form games. Assume that agents are matched in pairs to
play a symmetric two-player normal form game A ∈ Rn×n, where Ai j is the payoff obtained
by an i player who is matched with a j player. If each agent is matched with all other
agents (but not with himself), then average payoffs in the resulting population game are
given by FNi (x) =
1
N−1 (A(Nx − ei))i = (Ax)i + 1N−1 ((Ax)i − Aii) . _
Example 2.2. Congestion games. To define a congestion game (Beckmann et al. (1956), Rosen-
thal (1973)), one specifies a collection of facilities Λ (e.g., links in a highway network), and
associates with each facility λ ∈ Λ a function `Nλ : {0, 1N , . . . , 1} → R describing the cost (or
benefit, if `Nλ < 0) of using the facility as a function of the fraction of the population that
uses it. Each action i ∈ A (a path through the network) requires the facilities in a given set
Λi ⊆ Λ (the links on the path), and the payoff to action i is the negative of the sum of the
costs accruing from these facilities. Payoffs in the resulting population game are given by
FNi (x) = −
∑
λ∈Λi `
N
λ (uλ(x)), where uλ(x) =
∑
i: λ∈Λi xi denotes the total utilization of facility λ
at state x. _
Because the population size is finite, the payoff vector an agent considers when revising
may depend on his current action. To allow for this possibility, we let FNi→· : X N → Rn
denote the payoff vector considered at state x by a action i player.
Example 2.3. Simple payoff evaluation. Under simple payoff evaluation, all agents’ decisions
are based on the current vector of payoffs: FNi→ j(x) = F
N
j (x) for all i, j ∈ A . _
Example 2.4. Clever payoff evaluation. Under clever payoff evaluation, an action i player
accounts for the fact that by switching to action j at state x, he changes the state to the
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adjacent state y = x + 1N (e j− ei). To do so, he evaluates payoffs according to the clever payoff
vector FNi→ j(x) = F
N
j (x +
1
N (e j − ei)).9 _
As the assumptions in Section 2.4 will make clear, our results are the same whether
simple or clever payoff evaluation is assumed.
2.2 Revision protocols
In our model of evolution, each agent occasionally receives opportunities to switch
actions. At such moments, an agent decides which action to play next by employing a
protocol ρN : Rn ×X N → Xn, with the choice probabilities of a current action i player being
described by ρNi · : R
n×X N → X. Specifically, if a revising action i player faces payoff vector
pi ∈ Rn at population state x ∈ X N, then the probability that he proceeds by playing action
j is ρNij (pi, x). We will assume shortly that this probability is bounded away from zero, so
that there is always a nonnegligible probability of the revising agent playing each of the
actions in A ; see condition (6) below.
Example 2.5. The logit protocol. A fundamental example of a revision protocol with positive
choice probabilities is the logit protocol, defined by
(1) ρNij (pi, x) =
exp(η−1pi j)∑
k∈A exp(η−1pik)
for some noise level η > 0. When η is small, an agent using this protocol is very likely
to choose an optimal action, but places positive probability on every action, with lower
probabilities being placed on worse-performing actions. _
Example 2.6. Perturbed best response protocols. One can generalize (1) by assuming that
agents choice probabilities maximize the difference between their expected base payoff
and a convex penalty:
ρNi· (pi, x) = argmax
x∈int(X)
∑
k∈A
pikxk − h(x)
 ,
where h : int(X) → R is strictly convex and steep, in the sense that |∇h(x)| approaches
infinity whenever x approaches the boundary of X. The logit protocol (1) is recovered
when h is the negated entropy function η−1
∑
k∈A xk log xk. _
9This adjustment is important in finite population models: see Sandholm (2010b, Section 11.4.2) or
Sandholm and Staudigl (2016).
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Example 2.7. The pairwise logit protocol. Under the pairwise logit protocol, a revising agent
chooses a candidate action distinct from his current action at random, and then applies
the logit rule (1) only to his current action and the candidate action:
ρNij (pi, x) =

1
n−1 ·
exp(η−1pi j)
exp(η−1pii)+exp(η−1pi j)
if j , i
1
n−1
∑
k,i
exp(η−1pii)
exp(η−1pii)+exp(η−1pik)
if j = i. _
Example 2.8. Imitation with “mutations”. Suppose that with probability 1 − ε, a revising
agent picks an opponent at random and switches to her action with probability propor-
tional to the opponent’s payoff, and that with probability ε > 0 the agent chooses an
action at random. If payoffs are normalized to take values between 0 and 1, the resulting
protocol takes the form
ρNij (pi, x) =
(1 − ε)
N
N−1x j pi j +
ε
n if j , i
(1 − ε)
(
Nxi−1
N +
∑
k,i
N
N−1xk(1 − pik)
)
+ εn if j = i.
The positive mutation rate ensures that all actions are chosen with positive probability. _
For many further examples of revision protocols, see Sandholm (2010b).
2.3 The stochastic evolutionary process
Together, a population game FN and a revision protocol ρN define a discrete-time
stochastic process XN = {XNk }∞k=0, which is defined informally as follows: During each
period, a single agent is selected at random and given a revision opportunity. The
probabilities with which he chooses each action are obtained by evaluating the protocol
ρN at the relevant payoff vector and population state. Each period of the process XN takes
1
N units of clock time, as this fixes at one the expected number of revision opportunities
that each agent receives during one unit of clock time.
More precisely, the process XN is a Markov chain with initial condition XN0 ∈ X N and
transition law
(2) P
(
XNk+1 = y
∣∣∣ XNk = x) =

xi ρNij (F
N
i→·(x), x) if y = x +
1
N (e j − ei) and j , i,∑n
i=1 xi ρNii (F
N
i→·(x), x) if y = x,
0 otherwise.
When a single agent switches from action i to action j, the population state changes from
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x to y = x + 1N (e j − ei). This requires that the revision opportunity be assigned to a current
action i player, which occurs with probability xi, and that this player choose to play action
j, which occurs with probability ρNij (F
N
i→·(x), x). Together these yield the law (2).
Example 2.9. Suppose that N agents are matched to play the normal form game A ∈ Rn×n,
using clever payoff evaluation and the logit choice rule with noise level η > 0. Then if
the state in period k is x ∈ X N, then by Examples 2.1, 2.4, and 2.5 and equation (2), the
probability that the state in period k + 1 is x + 1N (e j − ei) , x is equal to10
P
(
XNk+1 = x +
1
N (e j − ei)
∣∣∣ XNk = x) = xi · exp
(
η−1 · 1N−1 (A(Nx − ei)) j
)
∑
`∈A
exp
(
η−1 · 1N−1 (A(Nx − ei))`
) . _
2.4 A class of population processes
It will be convenient to consider an equivalent class of Markov chains defined using
a more parsimonious notation. All Markov chains to come are defined on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), and we sometimes use the notation Px to indicate that the Markov chain
XN under consideration is run from initial condition x ∈ X N.
The Markov chain XN = {XNk }∞k=0 runs on the discrete grid X N = X ∩ 1NZn, with each
period taking 1N units of clock time, so that each agent expects to receive one revision
opportunity per unit of clock time (cf. Section 3.1). We define the law of XN by setting an
initial condition XN0 ∈ X N and specifying subsequent states via the recursion
(3) XNk+1 = X
N
k +
1
Nζ
N
k+1.
The normalized increment ζNk+1 follows the conditional law ν
N( · |XNk ), defined by
(4) νN(z |x) =

xi σNij (x) if z = e j − ei and j , i,∑n
i=1 xi σNii (x) if z = 0,
0 otherwise,
where the function σN : X N → Rn×n+ satisfies
∑
j∈A σNij (x) = 1 for all i ∈ A and x ∈ X N.
The switch probability σNij (x) is the probability that an agent playing action i who receives a
revision opportunity proceeds by playing action j. The model described in the previous
sections is the case in which σNij (x) = ρ
N
ij (F
N
i→·(x), x).
10Since the logit protocol is parameterized by a noise level and since clever payoff evaluation is used, this
example satisfies the assumptions of our analysis of the small noise double limit in Sandholm and Staudigl
(2016).
–9–
We observe that the support of the transition measure νN( · |x) is contained in the set of
raw increments Z = {e j − ei : i, j ∈ A}. Since an unused action cannot become less common,
the support of νN( · |x) is contained in Z(x) = {z ∈ Z : xi = 0⇒ zi ≥ 0}.
Our large deviations results concern the behavior of sequences {XN}∞N=N0 of Markov
chains defined by (3) and (4). To allow for finite population effects, we permit the switch
probabilities σNij (x) to depend on N in a manner that becomes negligible as N grows large.
Specifically, we assume that there is a Lipschitz continuous function σ : X N → Rn×n+ that
describes the limiting switch probabilities, in the sense that
(5) lim
N→∞maxx∈XN
max
i, j∈A
|σNij (x) − σi j(x)| = 0.
In the game model, this assumption holds when the sequences of population games FN
and revision protocols ρN have at most vanishing finite population effects, in that they
converge to a limiting population game F : X → Rn and a limiting revision protocol
ρ : Rn × X→ R, both of which are Lipschitz continuous.
In addition, we assume that limiting switch probabilities are bounded away from zero:
there is a ς > 0 such that
(6) min
x∈X mini, j∈A
σi j(x) ≥ ς.
This assumption is satisfied in the game model when the choice probabilities ρNij (pi, x) are
bounded away from zero.11 This is so under all of the revision protocols from Section 2.2.
Assumption (6) and the transition law (4) imply that the Markov chain XN is aperiodic
and irreducible for N large enough. Thus for such N, XN admits a unique stationary
distribution, µN, which is both the limiting distribution of the Markov chain and its
limiting empirical distribution along almost every sample path.
Assumptions (5) and (6) imply that the transition kernels (4) of the Markov chains XN
approach a limiting kernel ν : X→ ∆(Z), defined by
(7) ν(z |x) =

xi σi j(x) if z = e j − ei and j , i∑
i∈A xi σii(x) if z = 0,
0 otherwise.
Condition (5) implies that the convergence of νN to ν is uniform:
11More specifically, the bound on choice probabilities must hold uniformly over the payoff vectors pi that
may arise in the population games FN.
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(8) lim
N→∞maxx∈XN
max
z∈Z
∣∣∣νN(z |x) − ν(z |x)∣∣∣ = 0.
The probability measures ν( · |x) depend Lipschitz continuously on x, and by virtue of
condition (6), each measure ν( · |x) has support Z(x).
3. Sample Path Large Deviations
3.1 Deterministic approximation
Before considering the large deviations properties of the processes XN, we describe
their typical behavior. By definition, each period of the process XN = {XNk }∞k=0 takes 1N units
of clock time, and leads to a random increment of size 1N . Thus when N is large, each
brief interval of clock time contains a large number of periods during which the transition
measures νN( · |XNk ) vary little. Intuition from the law of large numbers then suggests that
over this interval, and hence over any finite concatenation of such intervals, the Markov
chain XN should follow an almost deterministic trajectory, namely the path determined
by the process’s expected motion.
To make this statement precise, note that the expected increment of the process XN
from state x during a single period is
(9) E(XNk+1 − XNk |XNk = x) =
1
N
E(ζNk |XNk = x) =
1
N
∑
z∈Z
z νN(z |x).
Since there are N periods per time unit, the expected increment per time unit is obtained
by multiplying (9) by N. Doing so and taking N to its limit defines the mean dynamic,
(10a) x˙ =
∑
z∈Z
z ν(z |x) = Eζx,
where ζx is a random variable with law ν(·|x). Substituting in definition (7) and simplifying
yields the coordinate formula
(10b) x˙i =
∑
j∈A
x j σ ji(x) − xi.
Assumption (6) implies that the boundary of the simplex is repelling under (10). Since the
right hand side of (10) is Lipschitz continuous, it admits a unique forward solution {xt}t≥0
from every initial condition x0 = x in X, and this solution does not leave X.
A version of the deterministic approximation result to follow was first proved by Kurtz
–11–
(1970), with the exponential rate of convergence established by Benaı¨m (1998); see also
Benaı¨m and Weibull (2003, 2009). To state the result, we let | · | denote the `1 norm on Rn,
and we define XˆN = {XˆNt }t≥0 to be the piecewise affine interpolation of the process XN:
XˆNt = X
N
bNtc + (Nt − bNtc)(XNbNtc+1 − XNbNtc).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that {XNk } has initial condition xN ∈ X N, and let limN→∞ xN = x ∈ X. Let
{xt}t≥0 be the solution to (10) with x0 = x. For any T < ∞ there exists a constant c > 0 independent
of x such that for all ε > 0 and N large enough,
PxN
 sup
t∈[0,T]
∣∣∣XˆNt − xt∣∣∣ ≥ ε ≤ 2n exp(−cε2N).
3.2 The Crame´r transform and relative entropy
Stating our large deviations results requires some additional machinery.12 Let Rn0 =
{z ∈ Rn : ∑i∈A zi = 0} denote the set of vectors tangent to the simplex. The Crame´r transform
L(x, ·) : Rn0 → [0,∞] of probability distribution ν(·|x) ∈ ∆(Z) is defined by
(11) L(x, z) = sup
u∈Rn0
(〈u, z〉 −H(x,u)) , where H(x,u) = log
∑
z∈Z
e〈u,z〉 ν(z |x)
 .
In words, L(x, ·) is the convex conjugate of the log moment generating function of ν(·|x).
It is well known that L(x, ·) is convex, lower semicontinuous, and nonnegative, and that
L(x, z) = 0 if and only if z = Eζx; moreover, L(x, z) < ∞ if and only if z ∈ Z(x), where
Z(x) = conv(Z(x)) is the convex hull of the support of ν( · |x).
To help interpret what is to come, we recall Crame´r’s theorem: Let {ζkx}∞k=1 be a sequence
of i.i.d. random variables with law ν( · |x), and let ζ¯Nx be the sequence’s Nth sample mean.
Then for any set V ⊆ Rn,
lim sup
N→∞
1
N logP(ζ¯
N
x ∈ V) ≤ − infz∈cl(V) L(x, z), and(12a)
lim inf
N→∞
1
N logP(ζ¯
N
x ∈ V) ≥ − infz∈int(V) L(x, z).(12b)
Thus for “nice” sets V, those for which the right-hand sides of the upper and lower
bounds (12a) and (12b) are equal, this common value is the exponential rate of decay of
the probability that ζ¯Nx lies in V.
12For further background on this material, see Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) or Dupuis and Ellis (1997).
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Our analysis relies heavily on a well-known characterization of the Crame´r transform
as a constrained minimum of relative entropy, a characterization that also provides a clear
intuition for Crame´r’s theorem. Recall that the relative entropy of probability measure
λ ∈ ∆(Z) given probability measure pi ∈ ∆(Z) is the extended real number
R(λ||pi) =
∑
z∈Z
λ(z) log λ(z)
pi(z) ,
with the conventions that 0 log 0 = 0 log 00 = 0. It is well known that R(·||·) is convex, lower
semicontinuous, and nonnegative, that R(λ||pi) = 0 if and only λ = pi, and that R(λ||pi) < ∞
if and only if supp(λ) ⊆ supp(pi).
A basic interpretation of relative entropy is provided by Sanov’s theorem, which concerns
the asymptotics of the empirical distributions ENx of the sequence {ζkx}∞k=1, defined by
ENx (z) = 1N
∑N
k=1 1(ζkx = z). This theorem says that for every set of distributions Λ ⊆ ∆(Z),
lim sup
N→∞
1
N logP(E
N
x ∈ Λ) ≤ − inf
λ∈Λ
R(λ||ν( · |x)), and(13a)
lim inf
N→∞
1
N logP(E
N
x ∈ Λ) ≥ − inf
λ∈int(Λ)
R(λ||ν( · |x)).(13b)
Thus for “nice” sets Λ, the probability that the empirical distribution lies in Λ decays at
an exponential rate given by the minimal value of relative entropy on Λ.
The intuition behind Sanov’s theorem and relative entropy is straightforward. We
can express the probability that the Nth empirical distribution is the feasible distribution
λ ∈ Λ as the product of the probability of obtaining a particular realization of {ζkx}∞k=1 with
empirical distribution λ and the number of such realizations:
P(ENx = λ) =
∏
z∈Z
ν(z |x)Nλ(z) × N!∏
z∈Z (Nλ(z))!
.
Then applying Stirling’s approximation n! ≈ nne−n yields
1
N
logP(ENx = λ) ≈
∑
z∈Z
λ(z) log ν(z |x) −
∑
z∈Z
λ(z) logλ(z) = −R(λ||ν( · |x)).
The rate of decay of P(ENx ∈ Λ) is then determined by the “most likely” empirical distri-
bution in Λ: that is, by the one whose relative entropy is smallest.13
The representation of the Crame´r transform in terms of relative entropy is obtained by
13Since number of empirical distributions for sample size N grows polynomially (it is less than (N + 1)|Z|),
the rate of decay cannot be determined by a large set of distributions in Λ with higher relative entropies.
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a variation on the final step above: given Sanov’s theorem, the rate of decay of obtaining
a sample mean ζ¯Nx in V ⊂ Rn should be determined by the smallest relative entropy
associated with a probability distribution whose mean lies in V.14 Combining this idea
with (12a) and (12b) suggests the representation15
(14) L(x, z) = min
λ∈∆(Z)
R(λ||ν(·|x)) : ∑
z∈Z
zλ(z) = z
 .
If z ∈ Z(x), so that L(x, z) < ∞, then the minimum in (14) is attained uniquely.
3.3 Path costs
To state the large deviation principle for the sequence of interpolated processes {XˆN}∞N=N0 ,
we must introduce a function that characterizes the rates of decay of the probabilities of
sets of sample paths through the simplex X. Doing so requires some preliminary defini-
tions. For T ∈ (0,∞), let C [0,T] denote the set of continuous paths φ : [0,T]→ X through
X over time interval [0,T], endowed with the supremum norm. Let Cx[0,T] denote the
set of such paths with initial condition φ0 = x, and let ACx[0,T] be the set of absolutely
continuous paths in Cx[0,T].
We define the path cost function (or rate function) cx,T : C [0,T]→ [0,∞] by
(15) cx,T(φ) =

∫ T
0
L(φt, φ˙t) dt if φ ∈ ACx[0,T],
∞ otherwise.
By Crame´r’s theorem, L(φt, φ˙t) describes the “difficulty” of proceeding from state φt in
direction φ˙t under the transition laws of our Markov chains. Thus the path cost cx,T(φ)
represents the “difficulty” of following the entire path φ. Since L(x, z) = 0 if and only if
z = Eζx, path φ ∈ Cx[0,T] satisfies cx,T(φ) = 0 if and only if it is the solution to the mean
dynamic (10) from state x. In light of definition (15), we sometimes refer to the function
L : X ×Rn → [0,∞] as the running cost function.
As illustrated by Crame´r’s theorem, the rates of decay described by large deviation
principles are defined in terms of the smallest value of a function over the set of outcomes
in question. This makes it important for such functions to satisfy lower semicontinuity
properties. The following result, which follows from Proposition 6.2.4 of Dupuis and Ellis
14This general idea—the preservation of large deviation principles under continuous functions—is known
as the contraction principle. See Dembo and Zeitouni (1998).
15See Dembo and Zeitouni (1998), Section 2.1.2 or Dupuis and Ellis (1997), Lemma 6.2.3(f).
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(1997), provides such a property.
Proposition 3.2. The function cx,T is a (good) rate function: its lower level sets {φ ∈ C : cx,T(φ) ≤
M} are compact.
3.4 A sample path large deviation principle
Our main result, Theorem 3.3, shows that the sample paths of the interpolated processes
XˆN satisfy a large deviation principle with rate function (15). To state this result, we use
the notation XˆN[0,T] as shorthand for {XˆNt }t∈[0,T].
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that the processes {XˆN}∞N=N0 have initial conditions xN ∈ X N satisfying
lim
N→∞ x
N = x ∈ X. Let Φ ⊆ C [0,T] be a Borel set. Then
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
logPxN
(
XˆN[0,T] ∈ Φ
)
≤ − inf
φ∈cl(Φ)
cx,T(φ), and(16a)
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
logPxN
(
XˆN[0,T] ∈ Φ
)
≥ − inf
φ∈int(Φ)
cx,T(φ).(16b)
We refer to inequality (16a) as the large deviation principle upper bound, and to (16b) as
the large deviation principle lower bound.
While Crame´r’s theorem concerns the probability that the sample mean of N i.i.d.
random variables lies in a given subset of Rn as N grows large, Theorem 3.3 concerns the
probability that the sample path of the process XˆN[0,T] lies in a given subset of C [0,T] as N
grows large. If Φ ⊆ C [0,T] is a set of paths for which the infima in (16a) and (16b) are
equal and attained at some path φ∗, then Theorem 3.3 shows that the probability that the
sample path of XˆN[0,T] lies in Φ is of order exp(−Ncx,T(φ∗)).
3.5 Uniform results
Applications to Freidlin-Wentzell theory require uniform versions of the previous two
results, allowing for initial conditions xN ∈ X N that take values in compact subsets of X.
We therefore note the following extensions of Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 3.3.
Proposition3.4. For any compact set K ⊆ X and any M < ∞, the sets⋃x∈K{φ ∈ C [0,T] : cx,T(φ) ≤
M} are compact.
Theorem 3.5. Let Φ ⊆ C [0,T] be a Borel set. For every compact set K ⊆ X,
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
log
(
sup
xN∈K∩XN
PxN
(
XˆN[0,T] ∈ Φ
))
≤ − inf
x∈K infφ∈cl(Φ)
cx,T(φ), and(17a)
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lim inf
N→∞
1
N
log
(
inf
xN∈K∩XN
PxN
(
XˆN[0,T] ∈ Φ
))
≥ − sup
x∈K
inf
φ∈int(Φ)
cx,T(φ).(17b)
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is an easy extension of that of Proposition 6.2.4 of Dupuis
and Ellis (1997); compare p. 165 of Dupuis and Ellis (1997), where the property being
established is called compact level sets uniformly on compacts. Theorem 3.5, the uniform large
deviation principle, follows from Theorem 3.3 and an elementary compactness argument;
compare the proof of Corollary 5.6.15 of Dembo and Zeitouni (1998).
4. Applications
To be used in most applications, the results above must be combined with ideas from
Freidlin-Wentzell theory. In this section, we use the large deviation principle to study
the frequency of excursions from a globally stable rest point and the asymptotics of the
stationary distribution, with a full analysis of the case of logit choice in potential games.
We then remark on future applications to games with multiple stable equilibria, and the
wider scope for analytical solutions that may arise by introducing a second limit.
4.1 Excursions from a globally attracting state and stationary distributions
In this section, we describe results on excursions from stable rest points that can be
obtained by combining the results above with the work of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998)
and refinements due to Dembo and Zeitouni (1998), which consider this question in the
context of diffusion processes with a vanishingly small noise parameter. To prove the
results in our setting, one must adapt arguments for diffusions to sequences of processes
running on increasingly fine finite state spaces. As an illustration of the difficulties
involved, observe that while a diffusion process is a Markov process with continuous
sample paths, our original process XN is Markov but with discrete sample paths, while
our interpolated process XˆN has continuous sample paths but is not Markov.16 Since
neither process possesses both desirable properties, a complete analysis of the problem
is quite laborious. We therefore only sketch the main arguments here, and will present a
detailed analysis in future work.
Consider a sequence of processes XN satisfying the assumptions above and whose
mean dynamic (10) has a globally stable rest point x∗. We would like to estimate the time
until the process exits a given open set O ⊂ X containing x∗. By the large deviations logic
16When the interpolated process XˆN is halfway between adjacent states x and y at time k+1/2N , its position
at time kN determines its position at time
k+1
N .
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described in Section 3.2, we expect this time should be determined by the cost of the least
cost path that starts at x∗ and leaves O. With this in mind, let ∂O denote the boundary of
O relative to X, and define
Cy = inf
T>0
inf
φ∈Cx∗ [0,T]: φ(T)=y
cx∗,T(φ) for y ∈ X,(18)
C∂O = inf
y∈∂O
Cy.(19)
Thus Cy is the lowest cost of a path from x∗ to y, and the exit cost C∂O is the lowest cost of
a path that leaves O.
Now define τˆN
∂O = inf{t ≥ 0: XˆNt ∈ ∂O} to be the random time at which the interpolated
process XˆN hits ∂O of O. If this boundary satisfies a mild regularity condition,17 we can
show that for all ε > 0 and all sequences of xN ∈ X N converging to some x ∈ O, we have
lim
N→∞Px
N
(
C∂O − ε < 1N log τˆN∂O < C∂O + ε
)
= 1 and(20)
lim
N→∞
1
N logExN τˆ
N
∂O = C∂O.(21)
That is, the time until exit from O is of approximate order exp(NC∂O) with probability
near 1, and the expected time until exit from O is of this order as well. Since stationary
distribution weights are inversely proportional to expected return times, equation (21)
can be used to show that the rates of decay of stationary distribution weights are also
determined by minimal costs of paths. If we let Bδ(y) = {x ∈ X : |y − x| < δ}, then for all
y ∈ X and ε > 0, there is a δ sufficiently small that
(22) −Cy − ε ≤ 1N logµN(Bδ(y)) ≤ −Cy + ε.
for all large enough N.
The main ideas of the proofs of (20) and (21) are as follows. To prove the upper bounds,
we use the LDP lower bound to show there is a finite duration T such that the probability
of reaching ∂O in T time units starting from any state in O is at least qNT = exp(−N(C∂O +ε)).
It then follows from the strong Markov property that the probability of failing to reach ∂O
within kT time units is at most (1 − qNT )k. Put differently, if we define the random variable
RNT to equal k if ∂O is reached between times (k − 1)T and kT, then the distribution of RNT
is stochastically dominated by the geometric distribution with parameter qNT . It follows
that the expected time until ∂O is reached is at most T · ERNT ≤ T/qNT = T exp(N(C∂O + ε)),
17The condition requires that for all δ > 0 small enough, there is a nonempty closed set Kδ ⊂ X disjoint
from cl(O) such that for all x ∈ ∂O, there exists a y ∈ Kδ satisfying |x − y| = δ.
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yielding the upper bound in (21). The upper bound in (20) then follows from Chebyshev’s
inequality.
To prove the lower bounds in (20) and (21), we again view the process XˆN as making
a series of attempts to reach ∂O. Each attempt requires at least δ > 0 units of clock time,
and the LDP upper bound implies that for N large enough, an attempt succeeds with
probability less than exp(−N(C∂O− ε2 )). Thus to reach∂O within kδ time units, one of the first
k attempts must succeed, and this has probability less than k exp(−N(C∂O − ε2 )). Choosing
k ≈ δ−1 exp(N(C∂O − ε)), we conclude that the probability of exiting O in exp(N(C∂O − ε))
time units is less than kδ ≈ δ−1 exp(−Nε/2). This quantity vanishes as N grows large,
yielding the lower bound in (20); then Chebyshev’s inequality gives the lower bound in
(21).
4.2 Logit evolution in potential games
We now apply the results above in a context for which the exit costs CO can be computed
explicitly: that of evolution in potential games under the logit choice rule. Consider a
sequence of stochastic evolutionary processes {XN}∞N=N0 derived from population games
FN and revision protocols ρN that converge uniformly to Lipschitz continuous limits F
and ρ (see Section 2.4), where ρ is the logit protocol with noise level η > 0 (Example 2.5).
Theorem 3.1 implies that when N is large, the process XˆN is well-approximated over fixed
time spans by solutions to the mean dynamic (10), which in the present case is the logit
dynamic
(23) x˙ = Mη(F(x)) − x, where Mηj (pi) =
exp(η−1pi j)∑
k∈A exp(η−1pik)
.
Now suppose in addition that the limiting population game F is a potential game
(Sandholm (2001)), meaning that there is a function f : Rn+ → R such that ∇ f (x) = F(x)
for all x ∈ X.18 In this case, Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007) establish the following global
convergence result.
Proposition 4.1. If F is a potential game, then the logit potential function
(24) f η(x) = η−1 f (x) − h(x), h(x) =
∑
i∈A xi log xi.
18The analysis to follow only requires the limiting game F to be a potential game. In particular, there is no
need for the convergent sequence {FN} of finite-population games to consist of potential games (as defined
in Monderer and Shapley (1996)), or to assume that any of the processes XˆN are reversible (cf. Blume (1997)).
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is a strict global Lyapunov function for the logit dynamic (23). Thus solutions of (23) from every
initial condition converge to connected sets of rest points of (23).
We provide a concise proof of this result in Section 8. Together, Theorem 3.1 and Proposi-
tion 4.1 imply that for large N, the typical behavior of the process XˆN is to follow a solution
of the logit dynamic (23), ascending the function f η and approaching a rest point of (23).
We now use the large deviation principle to describe the excursions of the process XˆN
from stable rest points, focusing as before on cases where the mean dynamic (23) has a
globally attracting rest point x∗, which by Proposition 4.1 is the unique local maximizer
of f η on X.
According to the results from the previous section, the time required for the process to
exit an open set O containing x∗ is characterized by the exit cost (19), which is the infimum
over paths from x∗ to some y < O of the path cost
(25) cx∗,T(φ) =
∫ T
0
L(φt, φ˙t) dt =
∫ T
0
sup
ut∈Rn0
(
u′tφ˙t −H(φt,ut)
)
dt,
where the expression of the path cost in terms of the log moment generating functions
H(x, ·) follows from definition (11) of the Crame´r transform. In the logit/potential model,
we are able to use properties H to compute the minimal costs (18) and (19) exactly.
Proposition 4.2. In the logit/potential model, when (23) has a globally attracting rest point x∗,
we have c∗y = f η(x∗) − f η(y), and so C∗∂O = miny∈∂O ( f
η(x∗) − f η(y)).
In words, the minimal cost of a path from x∗ to state y , x∗ is equal to the decrease in
the logit potential. Combined with equations (20)–(22), Proposition 4.2 implies that the
waiting times τN
∂O to escape the set O is described by the smallest decrease in f
η required
to reach the boundary of O, and that f η also governs the rates of decay in the stationary
distributions weights µN(Bδ(y)).
Proof. We prove the proposition using tools from the calculus of variations (cf. Freidlin
and Wentzell (1998, Section 5.4)) and these two basic facts about the function H in the
logit/potential model, which we prove in Section 8:
Lemma 4.3. Suppose x ∈ int(X). Then in the logit/potential model,
H(x,−∇ f η(x)) = 0 and(26)
∇uH(x,−∇ f η(x)) = −(Mη(F(x)) − x).(27)
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Equation (26) is the Hamilton-Jacobi equation associated with path cost minimization
problem (18), and shows that changes in potential provide a lower bound on the cost of
reaching any state y from state x∗ along an interior path φ ∈ Cx∗[0,T] with φT = y:
(28) cx∗,T(φ) =
∫ T
0
sup
ut∈Rn0
(
u′tφ˙t −H(φt,ut)
)
dt ≥
∫ T
0
−∇ f η(φt)′φ˙t dt = f η(x∗) − f η(y).
In Section 8, we prove a generalization of (26) to boundary states which lets us extend
inequality (28) to paths with boundary segments—see equation (88). These inequalities
give us the lower bound
(29) c∗y ≥ f η(x∗) − f η(y).
Equation (27) is the first order condition for the first integrand in (28) for paths that are
reverse-time solutions to the logit dynamic (23). Thus if ψ : (−∞, 0] → X satisfies ψ0 = y
and ψ˙t = −(Mη(F(ψt))−ψt) for all t ≤ 0, then Proposition 4.1 and the assumption that x∗ is
globally attracting imply that limt→−∞ψt = x∗, which with (26) and (27) yields
(30)
∫ 0
−∞
sup
ut∈Rn0
(
u′tψ˙t −H(ψt,ut)
)
dt =
∫ 0
−∞
−∇ f η(ψt)′ψ˙t dt = f η(x∗) − f η(y).
This equation and a continuity argument imply that lower bound (29) is tight. 
Congestion games are the most prominent example of potential games appearing in
applications, and the logit protocol is a standard model of decision making in this context
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)). We now illustrate how the results above can be used to
describe excursions of the process XN from the stationary state of the logit dynamic and
the stationary distribution µN of the process. We consider a network with three parallel
links in order to simplify the exposition, as our analysis can be conducted just as readily
in any congestion game with increasing delay functions.
Example 4.4. Consider a network consisting of three parallel links with delay functions
`1(u) = 1 + 8u, `2(u) = 2 + 4u, and `3(u) = 4. The links are numbered in increasing order
of congestion-free travel times (lower-numbered links are shorter in distance), but in de-
creasing order of congestion-based delays (higher-numbered links have greater capacity).
The corresponding continuous-population game has payoff functions Fi(x) = −`i(xi) and
concave potential function
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f (x) = −
∑
i∈A
∫ xi
0
`i(u) du = −
(
x1 + 4(x1)2 + 2x2 + 2(x2)2 + 4x3
)
.
The unique Nash equilibrium of this game, x∗ = (38 , 12 , 18 ), is the state at which travel times
on each link are equal (`1(x∗1) = `2(x∗2) = `3(x∗3) = 4), and it is the maximizer of f on X.
Suppose that a large but finite population of agents repeatedly play this game, occa-
sionally revising their strategies by applying the logit rule Mη with noise level η. Then in
the short term, aggregate behavior evolves according to the logit dynamic (23), ascending
the logit potential function f η = η−1 f + h until closely approaching its global maximizer
xη. Thereafter, (20) and (21) imply that excursions from f η to other states y occur at rate
exp(N( f η(xη) − f η(y))). The values of N and f η(y) also describe the proportions of time
spent at each state: by virtue of (22), µN(Bδ(y)) ≈ exp(−N( f η(xη) − f η(y))).
Figure 1 presents solutions of the logit dynamic (23) and level sets of the logit po-
tential function f η in the congestion game above for noise levels η = .25 (panel (i))
and η = .1 (panel (ii)). In both cases, all solutions of (23) ascend the logit potential
function and converge to its unique maximizer, x(.25) ≈ (.3563, .4482, .1956) in (i), and
x(.1) = (.3648, .4732, .1620) in (ii). The latter rest point is closer to the Nash equilibrium on
account of the smaller amount of noise in agents’ decisions.
In each panel, the “major axes” of the level sets of f η correspond to exchanges of agents
playing strategy 3 for agents playing strategies 2 and 1 in fixed shares, with a slightly larger
share for strategy 2. That deviations of this sort are the most likely is explained by the
lower sensitivity of delays on higher numbered links to fluctuations in usage. In both
panels, the increments between the displayed level sets of f η are .5 units. Many more
level sets are drawn in panel (ii) than in panel (i):19 when there is less noise in agents’
decisions, excursions from equilibrium of a given unlikelihood are generally smaller, and
excursions of a given size and direction are less common. _
4.3 Discussion
The analyses above rely on the assumption that the mean dynamic (10) admits a
globally stable state. If instead this dynamic has multiple attractors, then the time τˆN
∂O to
exit O starting from a stable rest point x∗ ∈ O need only satisfy properties (20) and (21)
when the set O is contained in the basin of attraction of x∗. Beyond this case, the most
likely amount of time required to escape O may disagree with the expected amount of
time to do so, since the latter may be driven by a small probability of becoming stuck
19In panel (i), the size of the range of f η is f (.25)(x(.25))− f (.25)(e1) ≈ −10.73− (−20) = 9.27, while in panel (ii)
it is f (.1)(x(.1)) − f (.1)(e1) ≈ −28.38 − (−50) = 21.62.
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Figure 1: Solution trajectories of the logit dynamics and level sets of f η in a congestion game. In both
panels, lighter shades represent higher values of f η, and increments between level sets are .5 units. For any
point y on a solution trajectory, the most likely excursion path from the rest point to a neighborhood of y
follows the trajectory backward from the rest point. The values of f η also describe the rates of decay of
mass in the stationary distribution.
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near another attractor in O. Likewise, when the global structure of (10) is nontrivial,
the asymptotics of the stationary distribution are more complicated, being driven by
the relative likelihoods of transitions between the different attractors. To study these
questions in our context, one must not only address the complications noted in Section
4.1, but must also employ the graph-theoretic arguments developed by Freidlin and
Wentzell (1998, Chapter 6) to capture the structure of transitions among the attractors.
Because the limiting stationary distribution is the basis for the approach to equilibrium
selection discussed in the introduction, carrying out this analysis is an important task for
future work.
We have shown that the control problems appearing in the statement of the large
deviation principle can be solved explicitly in the case of logit choice in potential games.
They can also be solved in the context of two-action games, in which the state space X is
one-dimensional. Beyond these two cases, the control problems do not appear to admit
analytical solutions.
To contend with this, and to facilitate comparisons with other analyses in the literature,
one can consider the large population double limit, studying the behavior of the large popu-
lation limit as the noise level in agents’ decisions is taken to zero. There are strong reasons
to expect this double limit to be analytically tractable. In Sandholm and Staudigl (2016),
we study the reverse order of limits, under which the noise level η is first taken to zero,
and then the population size N to infinity. For this order of limits, we show that large de-
viations properties are determined by the solutions to piecewise linear control problems,
and that these problems can be solved analytically. Moreover, Sandholm (2010a) uses
birth-death chain methods to show that in the two-action case, large deviations properties
under the two orders of limits are identical. These results and our preliminary analyses
suggest that the large population double limit is tractable, and that in typical cases, con-
clusions for the two orders of limits will agree. While we are a number of steps away
from reaching these ends, the analysis here provides the tools required for work on this
program to proceed.
5. Analysis
The proof of Theorem 3.3 follows the weak convergence approach of Dupuis and Ellis
(1997) (henceforth DE). As noted in the introduction, the main novelty we must contend
with is the fact that our processes run on a compact set X. This necessitates a delicate
analysis of the behavior of the process on and near the boundary of X. At the same time,
the fact that the conditional laws (4) have finite support considerably simplifies a number
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of the steps from DE’s approach. Proofs of auxiliary results that would otherwise interrupt
the flow of the argument are relegated to Sections 6 and 7. Some technical arguments that
mirror those from DE are provided in Section 9.
Before entering into the details of our analysis, we provide an overview. In Section
5.1, we use the representation (14) of the Crame´r transform to establish joint continuity
properties of the running cost function L(·, ·). To start, we provide examples of discontinu-
ities that this function exhibits at the boundary of X. We then show that excepting these
discontinuities, the running cost function is “as continuous as possible” (Proposition 5.1).
The remaining sections follow the line of argument in DE, with modifications that
use Proposition 5.1 to contend with boundary issues. Section 5.2 describes how the large
deviation principle upper and lower bounds can be deduced from corresponding Laplace
principle upper and lower bounds. The latter bounds concern the limits of expectations
of continuous functions, making them amenable to analysis using weak convergence
arguments. Section 5.3 explains how the expectations appearing in the Laplace principle
can be expressed as solutions to stochastic optimal control problems (46), the running
costs of which are relative entropies defined with respect to the transition laws νN(·|x)
of XN. Section 5.4 describes the limit properties of the controlled processes as N grows
large. Finally, Sections 5.5 and 5.6 use the foregoing results to prove the Laplace principle
upper and lower bounds; here the main novelty is in Section 5.6, where we show that
the control problem appearing on the right hand side of the Laplace principle admits
ε-optimal solutions that initially obey the mean dynamic and remain in the interior of the
simplex thereafter (Proposition 5.8).
5.1 Joint continuity of running costs
Representation (14) implies that for each x ∈ X, the Crame´r transform L(x, ·) is contin-
uous on its domain Z(x) (see the beginning of the proof of Proposition 5.1 below). The
remainder of this section uses this representation to establish joint continuity properties
of the running cost function L(·, ·).
The difficulty lies in establishing these properties at states on the boundary of X. Fix
x ∈ X, and let i ∈ supp(x) and j , i. Since e j − ei is an extreme point of Z(x), the point mass
δe j−ei is the only distribution in ∆(Z) with mean e j − ei. Thus representation (14) implies
that
(31) L(x, e j − ei) = R(δe j−ei ||ν(·|x)) = − log xiσi j(x) ≥ − log xi.
Thus L(x, e j − ei) grows without bound as x approaches the face of X on which xi = 0, and
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L(x, e j − ei) = ∞ when xi = 0. Intuitively, reducing the number of action i players reduces
the probability that such a player is selected to revise; when there are no such players,
selecting one becomes impossible.
A more serious difficulty is that running costs are not continuous at the boundary of
X even when they are finite. For example, suppose that n ≥ 3, let x be in the interior of X,
and let zα = e3 − (αe1 + (1 − α)e2). Since the unique λ with mean zα has λ(e3 − e1) = α and
λ(e3 − e2) = 1 − α, equation (14) implies that
L(x, zα) = α log
α
x1σ13(x)
+ (1 − α) log 1 − α
x2σ23(x)
.
If we set α(x) = −(log(x1σ13(x)))−1 and let x approach some x∗ with x∗1 = 0, then L(x, zα(x))
approaches 1 − log(x2σ23(x∗)); however, zα(x) approaches e3 − e2, and L(x∗, e3 − e2) =
− log(x2σ23(x∗)).
These observations leave open the possibility that the running cost function is contin-
uous as a face of X is approached, provided that one restricts attention to displacement
directions z ∈ Z = conv(Z) = conv({e j − ei : i, j ∈ A}) that remain feasible on that face.
Proposition 5.1 shows that this is indeed the case.
For any nonempty I ⊆ A , define X(I) = {x ∈ X : I ⊆ supp(x)}, Z(I) = {z ∈ Z : z j ≥
0 for all j < I}, and Z(I) = conv(Z(I)) = {z ∈ Z : z j ≥ 0 for all j < I}.
Proposition 5.1. (i) L(·, ·) is continuous on int(X) × Z.
(ii) For any nonempty I ⊆ A , L(·, ·) is continuous on X(I) × Z(I).
Proof. For any λ ∈ ∆(Z(I)) and x ∈ X(I), we have supp(λ) ⊆ Z(I) ⊆ supp(ν(·|x)). Thus
by the definition of relative entropy, the function L : X(I) × ∆(Z(I)) → [0,∞] defined by
L(x, λ) = R(λ||ν(·|x)) is real-valued and continuous.
Let
(32) ΛZ(I)(z) =
{
λ ∈ ∆(Z) : supp(λ) ⊆ Z(I),
∑
z∈Z zλ(z) = z
}
be the set of distributions on Z with support contained in Z(I) and with mean z. Then the
correspondence ΛZ(I) : Z(I) ⇒ ∆(Z(I)) defined by (32) is clearly continuous and compact-
valued. Thus if we define LI : X(I) × Z(I)→ [0,∞) by
(33) LI(x, z) = min{R(λ||ν(·|x)) : λ ∈ ΛZ(I)(z)},
then the theorem of the maximum (Berge (1963)) implies that LI is continuous.
By representation (14),
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(34) L(x, z) = min{R(λ||ν(·|x)) : λ ∈ ΛZ(z)}.
Since Z(A) = Z, (33) and (34) imply that LS(x, z) = L(x, z), establishing part (i).
To begin the proof of part (ii), we eliminate redundant cases using an inductive argu-
ment on the cardinality of I. Part (i) establishes the base case in which #I = n. Suppose
that the claim in part (ii) is true when #I > k ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1}; we must show that this claim
is true when #I = k.
Suppose that supp(x) = J ⊃ I, so that #J > k. Then the inductive hypothesis implies
that the restriction of L to X(J) × Z(J) is continuous at (x, z). Since X(J) ⊂ X(I) is open
relative to X and since Z(J) ⊃ Z(I), the restriction of L to X(I) × Z(I) is also continuous at
(x, z).
It remains to show that the restriction of L to X(I) × Z(I) is continuous at all (x, z) ∈
X(I)×Z(I) with supp(x) = I. SinceZ(I) ⊂ Z, (33) and (34) imply that for all (x, z) ∈ X(I)×Z(I),
(35) L(x, z) ≤ LI(x, z).
If in addition supp(x) = I, then L(x, λ) = ∞ whenever supp(λ) * Z(I), so (33) and (34)
imply that inequality (35) binds. Since LI is continuous, our remaining claim follows
directly from this uniform approximation:
Lemma 5.2. For any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for any x ∈ X with maxk∈ArI xk < δ
and any z ∈ Z(I), we have
(36) L(x, z) ≥ LI(x, z) − ε.
A constructive proof of Lemma 5.2 is provided in Section 6.
5.2 The large deviation principle and the Laplace principle
While Theorem 3.3 is stated for the finite time interval [0,T], we assume without loss
of generality that T = 1. In what follows, C denotes the set of continuous functions from
[0, 1] to X endowed with the supremum norm, Cx ⊂ C denotes the set of paths inC starting
at x, and AC ⊂ C and ACx ⊂ Cx are the subsets consisting of absolutely continuous paths.
Following DE, we deduce Theorem 3.3 from the Laplace principle.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that the processes {XˆN}∞N=N0 have initial conditions xN ∈ X N satisfying
lim
N→∞ x
N = x ∈ X. Let h : C → R be a bounded continuous function. Then
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lim sup
N→∞
1
N
logExN
[
exp
(
−Nh(XˆN)
)]
≤ − inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
, and(37a)
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
logExN
[
exp
(
−Nh(XˆN)
)]
≥ − inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
.(37b)
Inequality (37a) is called the Laplace principle upper bound, and inequality (37a) is called the
Laplace principle lower bound.
Because cx is a rate function (Proposition 3.2), the large deviation principle (Theorem
3.3) and the Laplace principle (Theorem 5.3) each imply the other. The forward implication
is known as Varadhan’s integral lemma (DE Theorem 1.2.1). For intuition, express the large
deviation principle as PxN (XN ≈ φ) ≈ exp(−Ncx(φ)), and argue heuristically that
ExN
[
exp(−Nh(XˆN))
]
≈
∫
Φ
exp(−Nh(φ))PxN (XN ≈ φ) dφ
≈
∫
Φ
exp(−N(h(φ) + cx(φ))) dφ
≈ exp
(
−N inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
))
,
where the final approximation uses the Laplace method for integrals (de Bruijn (1970)).
Our analysis requires the reverse implication (DE Theorem 1.2.3), which can be derived
heuristically as follows. Let Φ ⊂ C , and let the (extended real-valued, discontinuous)
function hΦ be the indicator function of Φ ⊂ C in the convex analysis sense:
hΦ(φ) =
0 if φ ∈ Φ,+∞ otherwise.
Then plugging hΦ into (37a) and (37b) yields
lim
N→∞
1
N
logPxN (XˆN ∈ Φ) = − inf
φ∈Φ
cx(φ),
which is the large deviation principle. The proof of DE Theorem 1.2.3 proceeds by
considering well-chosen approximations of hΦ by bounded continuous functions.
The statements that form the Laplace principle concern limits of expectations of con-
tinuous functions, and so can be evaluated by means of weak convergence arguments.
We return to this point at the end of the next section.
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5.3 The stochastic optimal control problem
For a given function h ∈ C → R, we define
(38) VN(xN) = − 1
N
logExN
[
exp(−Nh(XˆN))
]
to be the negation of the expression from the left hand side of the Laplace principle. This
section, which follows DE Sections 3.2 and 4.3, shows how VN can be expressed as the
solution of a stochastic optimal control problem. The running costs of this problem are
relative entropies, and its terminal costs are determined by the function h.
For each k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,N} and sequence (x0, . . . , xk) ∈ (X N)k+1, we define the period k
value function
(39) VNk (x0, . . . , xk) = −
1
N
logE
[
exp(−Nh(XˆN))
∣∣∣XN0 = x0, . . . ,XNk = xk] .
Note that VN0 ≡ VN. If we define the map φˆ ( = φˆN) from sequences x0, . . . , xN to paths in
C by
(40) φˆt(x0, . . . , xN) = xk + (Nt − k)(xk+1 − xk) for all t ∈ [ kN , k+1N ],
then (39) implies that
(41) VNN(x0, . . . , xN) = h(φˆ(x0, . . . , xN)).
Note also that XˆNt = φˆt(X
N
0 , . . . ,X
N
N); this can be expressed concisely as Xˆ
N = φˆ(XN).
Proposition 5.4 shows that the value functions VNk satisfy a dynamic programming
functional equation, with running costs given by relative entropy functions and with
terminal costs given by h(φˆ(·)). To read equation (42), recall that νN is the transition kernel
for the Markov chain {XNk }.
Proposition 5.4. For k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N − 1} and (x0, . . . , xk) ∈ (X N)k+1, we have
(42) VNk (x0, . . . , xk) = infλ∈∆(Z)
 1N R(λ || νN( · |xk)) + ∑
z∈Z
VNk+1(x0, . . . , xk +
1
Nz)λ(z)
 .
For k = N, VNN is given by the terminal condition (41).
The key idea behind Proposition 5.4 is the following observation (DE Proposition 1.4.2),
which provides a variational formula for expressions like (38) and (39).
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Observation 5.5. For any probability measure pi ∈ ∆(Z) and function γ : Z → R, we have
(43) − log
∑
z∈Z
e−γ(z)pi(z) = min
λ∈∆(Z)
R(λ||pi) + ∑
z∈Z
γ(z)λ(z)
 .
The minimum is attained at λ∗(z) = pi(z) e−γ(z)/∑y∈Z pi(y ) e−γ(y ). In particular, λ∗  pi.
Equation (43) expresses the log expectation on its left hand side as the minimized sum
of two terms: a relative entropy term that only depends on the probability measure pi,
and an expectation that only depends on the function γ. This additive separability and
the Markov property lead to equation (42). Specifically, observe that
exp
(
−NVNk (x0, . . . , xk)
)
= E
[
exp(−Nh(φˆ(XN)))
∣∣∣ XN0 = x0, . . . ,XNk = xk]
= E
[
E
[
exp(−Nh(φˆ(XN)))
∣∣∣ XN0 , . . . ,XNk+1] ∣∣∣ XN0 = x0, . . . ,XNk = xk]
= E
[
−NVNk+1(XN0 , . . . ,XNk+1)
∣∣∣ XN0 = x0, . . . ,XNk = xk]
=
∑
z∈Z
exp
(
−NVNk+1(x0, . . . , xk, xk + 1Nz)
)
νN(z |xk),
where the last line uses the Markov property. This equality and Observation 5.5 yield
VNk (x0, . . . , xk) = −
1
N
log
∑
z∈Z
exp
(
−NVNk+1(x0, . . . , xk, xk + 1Nz)
)
νN(z |xk)
=
1
N
inf
λ∈∆(Z)
R(λ || νN( · |xk)) + ∑
z∈Z
NVNk+1(x0, . . . , xk +
1
Nz)λ(z)
 ,
which is equation (42).
Since the value functions VNk satisfy the dynamic programming functional equation
(42), they also can be represented by describing the same dynamic program in sequence
form. To do so, we define for k ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1} a period k control λNk : (X N)k → ∆(Z), which
for each sequence of states (x0, . . . , xk) specifies a probability distribution λNk ( · |x0, . . . , xk),
namely the minimizer of problem (42). Given the sequence of controls {λNk }N−1k=0 and an
initial condition ξN0 = x
N ∈ X N, we define the controlled process ξN = {ξNk }Nk=0 by ξN0 = xN ∈
X N and the recursive formula
(44) ξNk+1 = ξ
N
k +
1
N
ζNk ,
where ζNk has law λ
N
k ( · |ξN0 , . . . , ξNk ). We also define the piecewise affine interpolation
ξˆN = {ξˆNt }t∈[0,1] by ξˆNt = φˆt(ξN), where φˆ is the interpolation function (40). We then have
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Proposition 5.6. For k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N − 1} and (x0, . . . , xk) ∈ (X N)k+1, VNk (x0, . . . , xk) equals
(45) inf
λNk ,...,λ
N
N−1
E
[
1
N
N−1∑
j=k
R
(
λNj ( · |ξN0 , . . . , ξNj ) || νN( · |ξNj )
)
+ h(ξˆN)
∣∣∣∣∣ξN0 = x0, . . . , ξNk = xk].
Since Observation 5.5 implies that the infimum in the functional equation (42) is always
attained, Proposition 5.6 follows from standard results (cf. DE Theorem 1.5.2), and more-
over, the infimum in (45) is always attained.
Since VN0 ≡ VN by construction, Proposition 5.6 yields the representation
(46) VN(xN) = inf
λN0 ,...,λ
N
N−1
ExN
[
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
R
(
λNj ( · |ξN0 , . . . , ξNj ) || νN( · |ξNj )
)
+ h(ξˆN)
]
.
The running costs in (46) are relative entropies of control distributions with respect to
transition distributions of the Markov chain XN, and so reflect how different the control
distribution is from the law of the Markov chain at the relevant state. Note as well that
the terminal payoff h(ξˆN) may depend on the entire path of the controlled process ξN.
With this groundwork in place, we can describe Dupuis and Ellis’s (1997) weak conver-
gence approach to large deviations as follows: Equation (46) represents expression VN(xN)
from the left-hand side of the Laplace principle as the expected value of the optimal so-
lution to a stochastic optimal control problem. For any given sequence of pairs of control
sequences {λNk }N−1k=0 and controlled processes ξN, Section 5.4 shows that suitably chosen
subsequences converge in distribution to some limits {λt}t∈[0,1] and ξ satisfying the averag-
ing property (48). This weak convergence and the continuity of h allow one to obtain limit
inequalities for VN(xN) using Fatou’s lemma and the dominated convergence theorem. By
considering the optimal control sequences for (46), one obtains both the candidate rate
function cx(·) and the Laplace principle upper bound (49). The Laplace principle lower
bound is then obtained by choosing a path ψ that approximately minimizes cx(·) + h(·),
constructing controlled processes that mirror ψ, and using the weak convergence of the
controlled processes and the continuity of L and h to establish the limit inequality (51).
5.4 Convergence of the controlled processes
The increments of the controlled process ξN are determined in two steps: first, the
history of the process determines the measure λNk ( · |ξN0 , . . . , ξNk ) ∈ ∆(Z), and then the
increment itself is determined by a draw from this measure. With some abuse of notation,
one can writeλNk (·) = λNk ( · |ξN0 , . . . , ξNk ), and thus viewλNk as a random measure. Then, using
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compactness arguments, one can show that as N grows large, certain subsequences of the
random measures λNk on ∆(Z) converge in a suitable sense to limiting random measures.
Because the increments of ξN become small as N grows large (cf. (44)), intuition from
the law of large numbers—specifically Theorem 3.1—suggests that the idiosyncratic part
of the randomness in these increments should be averaged away. Thus in the limit, the
evolution of the controlled process should still depend on the realizations of the random
measures, but it should only do so by way of their means.
The increments of the controlled process ξN are determined in two steps: first, the
history of the process determines the measure λNk ( · |ξN0 , . . . , ξNk ) ∈ ∆(Z), and then the
increment itself is determined by a draw from this measure. With some abuse of notation,
one can writeλNk (·) = λNk ( · |ξN0 , . . . , ξNk ), and thus viewλNk as a random measure. Then, using
compactness arguments, one can show that as N grows large, certain subsequences of the
random measures λNk on ∆(Z) converge in a suitable sense to limiting random measures.
Because the increments of ξN become small as N grows large (cf. (44)), intuition from
the law of large numbers—specifically Theorem 3.1—suggests that the idiosyncratic part
of the randomness in these increments should be averaged away. Thus in the limit, the
evolution of the controlled process should still depend on the realizations of the random
measures, but it should only do so by way of their means.
To make this argument precise, we introduce continuous-time interpolations of the
controlled processes ξN = {ξNk }Nk=0 and the sequence of controls {λNk }N−1k=0 . The piecewise
affine interpolation ξˆN = {ξˆNt }t∈[0,1] was introduced above; it takes values in the space
C = C ([0, 1] : X), which we endow with the topology of uniform convergence. The
piecewise constant interpolation ξ¯N = {ξ¯Nt }t∈[0,1] is defined by
ξ¯Nt =
 ξNk if t ∈ [ kN , k+1N ) and k = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 2,ξNN−1 if t ∈ [N−1N , 1].
The process ξ¯N takes values in the space D = D([0, 1] : X) of left-continuous functions
with right limits, which we endow with the Skorokhod topology. Finally, the piecewise
constant control process {λ¯Nt }t∈[0,1] is defined by
λ¯Nt (·) =
λ
N
k (· |ξN0 , . . . , ξNk ) if t ∈ [ kN , k+1N ) and k = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 2,
λNN−1(· |ξN0 , . . . , ξNN−1) if t ∈ [N−1N , 1].
Using these definitions, we can rewrite formulation (46) of VN(xN) as
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(47) VN(xN) = inf
λN0 ,...,λ
N
N−1
ExN
(∫ 1
0
R(λ¯Nt || νN(· | ξ¯Nt )) dt + h(ξˆN)
)
.
As noted after Proposition 5.6, the infimum in (47) is always attained by some choice of
the control sequence {λNk }N−1k=0 .
Let P (Z × [0, 1]) denote the space of probability measures on Z × [0, 1]. For a collection
{pit}t∈[0,1] of measures pit ∈ ∆(Z) that is Lebesgue measurable in t, we define the measure
pit ⊗ dt ∈ P (Z × [0, 1]) by
(pit ⊗ dt)({z} × B) =
∫
B
pit(z) dt
for all z ∈ Z and all Borel sets B of [0, 1]. Using this definition, we can represent the
piecewise constant control process {λ¯Nt }t∈[0,1] as the control measure ΛN = λ¯Nt ⊗ dt. Evidently,
ΛN is a random measure taking values inP (Z×[0, 1]), a space we endow with the topology
of weak convergence.
Proposition 5.7, a direct consequence of DE Theorem 5.3.5 and p. 165, formalizes the
intuition expressed in the first paragraph above. It shows that along certain subsequences,
the control measures ΛN and the interpolated controlled processes ξˆN and ξ¯N converge
in distribution to a random measure Λ and a random process ξ, and moreover, that the
evolution of ξ is amost surely determined by the means of Λ.
Proposition 5.7. Suppose that the initial conditions xN ∈ X N converge to x ∈ X, and that the
control sequence {λNk }N−1k=0 is such that supN≥N0VN(xN) < ∞.
(i) Given any subsequence of {(ΛN, ξˆN, ξ¯N)}∞N=N0 , there exists a P (Z × [0, 1])-valued random
measure Λ and C -valued random process ξ (both possibly defined on a new probability
space) such that some subsubsequence converges in distribution to (Λ, ξ, ξ) in the topologies
specified above.
(ii) There is a collection of ∆(Z)-valued random measures {λt}t∈[0,1], measurable with respect to
t, such that with probability one, the random measure Λ can be decomposed as Λ = λt⊗dt.
(iii) With probability one, the process ξ satisfies ξt = x +
∫ t
0
(
∑
z∈Z zλs(z)) ds for all t ∈ [0, 1],
and is absolutely continuous in t. Thus with probability one,
(48) ξ˙t =
∑
z∈Z zλt(z)
almost surely with respect to Lebesgue measure.
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5.5 Proof of the Laplace principle upper bound
In this section we consider the Laplace principle upper bound (37a), which definition
(38) allows us to express as
(49) lim inf
N→∞ V
N(xN) ≥ inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
.
The argument here follows DE Section 6.2. Let {λNk }N−1k=0 be the optimal control sequence
in representation (46), and let ξN be the corresponding controlled process. Define the
triples {(ΛN, ξˆN, ξ¯N)}∞N=N0 of interpolated processes as in Section 5.4. Proposition 5.7 shows
that for any subsequence of these triples, there is a subsubsequence that converges in
distribution to some triple (λt ⊗ dt, ξ, ξ) satisfying (48). Then one argues that along this
subsubsequence,
lim inf
N→∞ V
N(xN) ≥ Ex
(∫ 1
0
R
(
λt ||ν(·|ξt)
)
dt + h(ξ)
)
≥ Ex
∫ 1
0
L
ξt,∑
z∈Z
zλt(z)
 dt + h(ξ)

= Ex
(∫ 1
0
L(ξt, ξ˙t) dt + h(ξ)
)
≥ inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
.
The key ingredients needed to establish the initial inequality are equation (46), Sko-
rokhod’s theorem, equation (50) below, the lower semicontinuity of relative entropy, and
Fatou’s lemma. Then the second inequality follows from representation (14) of the Crame´r
transform, the equality from equation (48), and the final inequality from the definition (15)
of the cost function cx. Since the subsequence chosen initially was arbitrary, inequality
(49) is proved.
The details of this argument can be found in Section 9.1, which largely follows DE
Section 6.2. But while in DE the transition kernels νN(·|x) of the Markov chains are assumed
to be independent of N, here we allow for a vanishing dependence on N (cf. equation (8)).
Thus we require a simple additional argument, Lemma 9.1, that uses lower bound (6) to
establish the uniform convergence of relative entropies: namely, that if λN : X N → ∆(Z)
are transition kernels satisfying λN(·|x) νN(·|x) for all x ∈ X N, then
(50) lim
N→∞maxx∈XN
∣∣∣R(λN(·|x) ||νN(·|x)) − R(λN(·|x) ||ν(·|x))∣∣∣ = 0.
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5.6 Proof of the Laplace principle lower bound
Finally, we consider the Laplace principle lower bound (37b), which definition (38) lets
us express as
(51) lim sup
N→∞
VN(xN) ≤ inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
.
The argument here largely follows DE Sections 6.2 and 6.4. Their argument begins by
choosing a path that is ε-optimal in the minimization problem from the right-hand side
of (51). To account for our processes running on a set with a boundary, we show that this
path can be chosen to start with a brief segment that follows the mean dynamic, and then
stays in the interior of X thereafter (Proposition 5.8). With this choice of path, the joint
continuity properties of the running costs L(·, ·) established in Proposition 5.1 are sufficient
to complete the dominated convergence argument in display (59), which establishes that
inequality (51) is violated by no more than ε. Since ε was arbitrary, (51) follows.
For a path φ ∈ C = C ([0, 1] : X) and an interval I ⊆ [0, 1], write φI for {φt : t ∈ I}. Define
the set of paths
C˜ = {φ ∈ C : for some α ∈ (0, 1], φ[0,α] solves (10) and φ[α,1] ⊂ int(X)}.
Let C˜x denote the set of such paths that start at x.
Proposition 5.8. For all x ∈ X, inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
= inf
φ∈C˜
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
.
The proof of this result is rather involved, and is presented in Section 7.
The next proposition, a version of DE Lemma 6.5.5, allows us to further restrict our
attention to paths having convenient regularity properties. We let C ∗ ⊂ C˜ denote the set
of paths φ ∈ C˜ such that after the time α > 0 such that φα[0,α] solves (10), the derivative φ˙ is
piecewise constant and takes values in Z.
Proposition 5.9. inf
φ∈C˜
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
= inf
φ∈C ∗
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
.
The proof of Proposition 5.9 mimics that of DE Lemma 6.5.5; see Section 9.2 for details.
Now fix ε > 0. By the previous two propositions, we can choose an α > 0 and a path
ψ ∈ C ∗ such that ψ[0,α] solves (10) and
(52) cx(ψ) + h(ψ) ≤ inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
+ ε.
We now introduce a controlled process χN that follows ψ in expectation as long as it
remains in a neighborhood ofψ. Representation (14) implies that for each k ∈ {0, . . . ,N−1}
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and x ∈ X N, there is a transition kernelpiNk (· |x) that minimizes relative entropy with respect
to ν(·|x) subject to the aforementioned constraint on its expectation:
(53) R(piNk (· |x) ||ν(·|x)) = L(x, ψ˙k/N) and
∑
z∈Z
zpiNk (z |x) = ψ˙k/N.
To ensure that this definition makes sense for all k, we replace the piecewise continuous
function ψ˙ with its right continuous version.
Since ψ[0,α] solves (10), it follows from property (74) that there is an αˆ ∈ (0, α] such that
(54) ψ˙t ∈ Z(x) = {z ∈ Z : z j ≥ 0 for all j < supp(x)} whenever t ∈ [0, αˆ].
Property (74) also implies that (ψt)i ≥ xi ∧ ς for all t ∈ [0, α] and i ∈ supp(x). Now choose
a δ > 0 satisfying
(55) δ < min
(
{ς} ∪ {xi : i ∈ supp(x)} ∪ { 12 dist(ψt, ∂X) : t ∈ [αˆ, 1]}
)
.
For future reference, note that if y ∈ X satisfies |y−ψt| < δ, then |yi − (ψt)i| < δ2 for all i ∈ A
(by the definition of the `1 norm), and so if t ∈ [0, α] we also have
(56) y ∈ X¯x ≡ {xˆ ∈ X : xˆi ≥ 12 (xi ∧ ς) for all i ∈ supp(x)}.
For each (x0, . . . , xk) ∈ (X N)k+1, define the sequence of controls {λNk }N−1k=0 by
(57) λNk (z |x0, . . . , xk) =
pi
N
k (z |xk) if max0≤ j≤k |x j − ψ j/N| ≤ δ,
νN(z |xk) if max0≤ j≤k |x j − ψ j/N| > δ.
Finally, define the controlled process χN = {χNk }Nk=0 by setting χN0 = xN and using the recur-
sive formula χNk+1 = χ
N
k +
1
Nζ
N
k ,where ζ
N
k has law λ
N
k ( · |χN0 , . . . , χNk ). Under this construction,
the process χN evolves according to the transition kernels piNk , and so follows ψ in expecta-
tion, so long as it stays δ-synchronized with ψ. If this ever fails to be true, the evolution of
χN proceeds according to the kernel νN of the original process XN. This implies that until
the stopping time
(58) τN =
1
N
min
{
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N} : |χNk − ψk/N| > δ
}
∧ 1,
the relative entropies of transitions are given by (53), and that after τN these relative
entropies are zero.
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Define the pair {(ΛN, ξˆN)}∞N=N0 of interpolated processes as in Section 5.4. Proposition 5.7
shows that for any subsequence of these pairs, there is a subsubsequence that converges
in distribution to some pair (λt ⊗ dt, ξ) satisfying (48). By Prokhorov’s theorem, τN can be
assumed to converge in distribution on this subsubsequence to some [0, 1]-valued random
variable τ. Finally, DE Lemma 6.4.2 and Proposition 5.3.8 imply that τ = 1 and χ = ψwith
probability one.
For the subsubsequence specified above, we argue as follows:
lim sup
N→∞
VN(xN) ≤ lim
N→∞Ex
N
[
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
R
(
λNj ( · |χN0 , . . . , χNj ) || νN( · |χNj )
)
+ h(χˆN)
]
= lim
N→∞Ex
N
[
1
N
NτN−1∑
j=0
L(χNj , ψ˙ j/N) + h(χˆ
N)
]
= lim
N→∞Ex
N
[
1
N
(NτN∧bNαˆc)−1∑
j=0
L(χˆNj/N, ψ˙ j/N) +
1
N
NτN−1∑
j=NτN∧bNαˆc
L(χˆNj/N, ψ˙ j/N) + h(χˆ
N)
]
(59)
=
∫ αˆ
0
L(ψt, ψ˙t) dt +
∫ 1
αˆ
L(ψt, ψ˙t) dt + h(ψ)
= cx(ψ) + h(ψ).
The initial inequality follows from representation (46), the second line from the uniform
convergence in (50), along with equations (53), (57), and (58), and the fifth line from the
definition of cx. The fourth line is a consequence of the continuity of h, the convergence of
τN to τ, the uniform convergence of χˆN to ψ, the piecewise continuity and right continuity
of ψ˙, Skorokhod’s theorem, and the dominated convergence theorem. For the application
of dominated convergence to the first sum, we use the fact that when j/N < τN ∧ αˆ,
we have χˆNj/N ∈ X¯x (see (56)) and ψ˙ j/N ∈ Z(x) (see (54)), along with the fact that L(·, ·) is
continuous, and hence uniformly continuous and bounded, on X¯x ×Z(x), as follows from
Proposition 5.1(ii). For the application of dominated convergence to the second sum, we
use the fact when αˆ ≤ j/N < τN, we have dist(χˆNj/N, ∂X) ≥ δ2 (see (55)), and the fact that
L(·, ·) is continuous and bounded on Y × Z when Y is a closed subset of int(X), as follows
from Proposition 5.1(i).
Since every subsequence has a subsubsequence that satisfies (59), the sequence as a
whole must satisfy (59). Therefore, since ε > 0 was arbitrary, (59), (52), and (38) establish
inequality (51), and hence the lower bound (37b).
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6. Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2 follows from equation (34) and Lemma 6.2, which in turn requires Lemma
6.1. Lemma 6.1 shows that for any distribution λ on Z with mean z ∈ Z(I), there is a
distribution λ¯ onZ(I) whose mean is also z, with the variational distance between λ¯ and λ
bounded by a fixed multiple of the mass that λ places on components outside of Z(I). The
lemma also specifies some equalities that λ and λ¯ jointly satisfy. Lemma 6.2 shows that if
x puts little mass on actions outside I, then the reduction in relative entropy obtained by
switching from λ¯ to λ is small at best, uniformly over the choice of displacement vector
z ∈ Z(I).
Both lemmas require additional notation. Throughout what follows we write K for
A r I. For λ ∈ ∆(Z), write λi j for λ(e j − ei) when j , i. Write λ[i] = ∑ j,i λi j for the ith
“row sum” of λ and λ[ j] =
∑
i, j λi j for the jth “column sum”. (Remember that λ has no
“diagonal components”, but instead has a single null component λ0 = λ(0).) For I ⊆ A ,
write λI =
∑
i∈I λ[i] for the sum over all elements of λ from rows in I. If λ, λ¯ ∈ ∆(Z), we
apply the same notational devices to ∆λ = λ¯− λ and to |∆λ|, the latter of which is defined
by |∆λ|i j = |(∆λ)i j|. Finally, if χ ∈ RI+, we write χ[I] for
∑
i∈I χi.
Lemma 6.1. Fix z ∈ Z(I) and λ ∈ ΛZ(z). Then there exist a distribution λ¯ ∈ ΛZ(I)(z) and a vector
χ ∈ RI+ satisfying
(i) ∆λ[i] = ∆λ[i] = −χi for all i ∈ I,
(ii) ∆λ0 = λ[K] + χ[I],
(iii) χ[I] ≤ λ[K], and
(iv) |∆λ|[S] ≤ 3λ[K],
where ∆λ = λ¯ − λ.
Lemma 6.2. Fix ε > 0. There exists a δ > 0 such that for any x ∈ X with x¯K ≡ maxk∈K xk < δ,
any z ∈ Z(I), and any λ ∈ ΛZ(supp(x))(z), we have
R(λ||ν(·|x)) ≥ R(λ¯||ν(·|x)) − ε.
where λ¯ ∈ ΛZ(I)(z) is the distribution determined for λ in Lemma 6.1.
To see that Lemma 6.2 implies Lemma 5.2, fix x ∈ X with x¯K < δ and z ∈ Z(I), and
let λ ∈ ΛZ(z) and λI ∈ ΛZ(I)(z) be the minimizers in (34) and (33), respectively; then since
λ¯ ∈ ΛZ(I)(z),
L(x, z) = R(λ||ν(·|x)) ≥ R(λ¯||ν(·|x)) − ε ≥ R(λI||ν(·|x)) − ε = LI(x, z) − ε.
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6.1 Proof of Lemma 6.1
To prove Lemma 6.1, we introduce an algorithm that incrementally constructs the pair
(λ¯, χ) ∈ ΛZ(I)(z) ×RI+ from the pair (λ, 0) ∈ ΛZ(z) ×RI+. All intermediate states (ν, pi) of the
algorithm are in ΛZ(z) ×RI+.
Suppose without loss of generality that K = {1, . . . , k¯}. The algorithm first reduces all
elements of the first row of λ to 0, then all elements of the second row, and eventually all
elements of the k¯th row.
Suppose that at some stage of the algorithm, the state is (ν, pi) ∈ ΛZ(z) × RI+, rows 1
through k − 1 have been zeroed, and row k has not been zeroed:
ν[h] = 0 for all h < k, and(60)
ν[k] > 0.(61)
Since ν ∈ ΛZ(z) and z ∈ Z(I),
ν[i] − ν[i] =
∑
z∈Z ziν(z) = zi for all i ∈ I, and(62)
ν[`] − ν[`] =
∑
z∈Z z`ν(z) = z` ≥ 0 for all ` ∈ K.(63)
(61) and (63) together imply that ν[k] > 0. Thus there exist j , k and i , k such that
(64) νkj ∧ νik ≡ c > 0.
Using (64), we now construct the algorithm’s next state (νˆ, pˆi) from the current state
(ν, pi) using one of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases, as described next; only
the components of ν and pi whose values change are noted explicitly.
Case 1: i , j Case 2: i = j ∈ K Case 3: i = j ∈ I
νˆkj = νkj − c νˆkj = νkj − c νˆkj = νkj − c
νˆik = νik − c νˆ jk = ν jk − c νˆ jk = ν jk − c
νˆi j = νi j + c
νˆ0 = ν0 + c νˆ0 = ν0 + 2c νˆ0 = ν0 + 2c
pˆii = pii + c
In what follows, we confirm that following the algorithm to completion leads to a final
state (λ¯, χ) with the desired properties.
Write ∆ν = νˆ − ν and ∆pi = pˆi − pi, and define |∆ν| componentwise as described above.
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The following statements are immediate:
Case 1: i , j Case 2: i = j ∈ K Case 3: i = j ∈ I
∆ν[k] = ∆
[k] = −c ∆ν[k] = ∆ν[k] = −c ∆ν[k] = ∆ν[k] = −c(65a)
∆ν[ j] = ∆ν
[ j] = −c ∆ν[ j] = ∆ν[ j] = −c(65b)
∆ν[`] = ∆ν
[`] = 0, ` , k ∆ν[`] = ∆ν[`] = 0, ` < {k, j} ∆ν[`] = ∆ν[`] = 0, ` < {k, j}(65c)
∆ν0 = c ∆ν0 = 2c ∆ν0 = 2c(65d)
∆pi[I] = 0 ∆pi[I] = 0 ∆pi[I] = c(65e)
∆ν[K] = −c ∆ν[K] = −2c ∆ν[K] = −c(65f)
|∆ν|[A] = 3c |∆ν|[A] = 2c |∆ν|[S] = 2c(65g)
The initial equalities in (65a)–(65c) imply that if ν is in ΛZ(z), then so is νˆ. (65a)–(65c)
also imply that no step of the algorithm increases the mass in any row of ν. Moreover,
(64) and the definition of the algorithm imply that during each step, no elements of the
kth row or the kth column of ν are increased, and that at least one such element is zeroed.
It follows that row 1 is zeroed in at most 2n − 3 steps, followed by row 2, and ultimately
followed by row k¯. Thus a terminal state with λ¯[K] = 0, and hence with λ¯ ∈ ΛZ(I)(z), is
reached in a finite number of steps. For future reference, we note that
(66) ∆λ[K] = λ¯[K] − λ[K] = −λ[K].
We now verify conditions (i)-(iv) from the statement of the lemma. First, for any i ∈ I,
(65b), (65c), and (65e) imply that in all three cases of the algorithm, ∆ν[i] = ∆ν[i] = −∆pi[I];
the common value is 0 in Cases 1 and 2 and −c in Case 3. Thus aggregating over all steps
of the algorithm yields ∆λ[i] = ∆λ[i] = −χi, which is condition (i).
Second, (65d)–(65f) imply that in all three cases, ∆ν0 = −∆ν[K] + ∆pi[I]. Aggregating
over all steps of the algorithm yields ∆λ0 = −∆λ[K] + χ[I]. Then substituting (66) yields
∆λ0 = λ[K] + χ[I] which is condition (ii).
Third, (65e) and (65f) imply that in all three cases, ∆pi[I] ≤ −∆ν[K]. Aggregating and
using (66) yields χ[I] ≤ −∆λ[K] = λ[K], establishing (iii).
Fourth, (65f) and (65g) imply that in all three cases, |∆ν|[A] ≤ −3∆ν[K]. Aggregating and
using (66) yields |∆λ|[A] ≤ −3∆λ[K] = 3λ[K], establishing (iv).
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.1.
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6.2 Proof of Lemma 6.2
To prove Lemma 6.2, it is natural to introduce the notation d = λ−λ¯ = −∆λ to represent
the increment generated by a move from distribution λ¯ ∈ ΛZ(I)(z) to distribution λ ∈ ΛZ(z).
We will show that when x¯K = maxk<I xi is small, such a move can only result in a slight
reduction in relative entropy.
To start, observe that
d[i] = d[i] = χi for all i ∈ I,(67)
d[k] = d[k] = λ[k] for all k ∈ K,(68)
d0 = −λ[K] − χ[I] ≥ −2λ[K], and(69)
|d|[A] ≤ 3λ[K].(70)
Display (67) follows from part (i) of Lemma 6.1, display (69) from parts (ii) and (iii), and
display (70) from part (iv). For display (68), note first that since λ and λ¯ are both in ΛZ(z),
we have
λ[k] − λ[k] =
∑
z∈Z zkλ(z) = zk =
∑
z∈Z zkλ¯(z) = λ¯
[k] − λ¯[k],
and hence
d[k] = λ[k] − λ¯[k] = λ[k] − λ¯[k] = d[k];
then (68) follows from the fact that λ¯[k] = 0, which is true since λ¯ ∈ ΛZ(I)(z).
By definition,
R(λ||ν(·|x)) =
∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
(
λi j logλi j − λi j log xiσi j
)
+ λ0 logλ0 − λ0 log Σ,
where σi j = σi j(x) and Σ =
∑
j∈A x jσ j j. Thus, writing `(p) = p log p for p ∈ (0, 1] and `(0) = 0,
we have
R(λ||ν(·|x)) − R(λ¯||ν(·|x)) =
∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
(
`(λi j) − `(λ¯i j)
)
+
(
`(λ0) − `(λ¯0))(71)
−
∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
di j log xiσi j + d0 log Σ
 .
We first use (67)–(69), Lemma 6.1(iii), and the facts that χ ≥ 0 and Σ ≥ ς to obtain a
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lower bound on the final term of (71):
−
(∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
di j log xiσi j + d0 log Σ
)
= −
∑
i∈I
χi log xi −
∑
k∈K
λ[k] log xk −
∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
di j log σi j +
∑
i∈I
χi +
∑
k∈K
λ[k]
 log Σ
≥
∑
i∈I
χi log Σ +
∑
k∈K
λ[k] log
Σ
xk
+
∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
|di j| log σi j
≥ χ[I] log ς + λ[K] log ςx¯K + |d|[A] log ς
≥ λ[K] log ς + λ[K] log ςx¯K + 3λ[K] log ς
≥ λ[K] log ς
5
x¯K
.
To bound the initial terms on the right-hand side of (71), observe that the function
` : [0, 1] → R is convex, nonpositive, and minimized at e−1, where `(e−1) = −e−1. Define
the convex function ˆ`: [0, 1] → R by ˆ`(p) = `(p) if p ≤ e−1 and ˆ`(p) = −e−1 otherwise. We
now argue that for any p, q ∈ [0, 1], we have
(72) −|`(p) − `(q)| ≥ ˆ`(|p − q|).
Since ` is nonpositive with minimum−e−1,−|`(p)−`(q)| ≥ −e−1 always holds. If |p−q| ≤ e−1,
then −|`(p)− `(q)| ≥ min{`(|p− q|), `(1− |p− q|)} = `(|p− q|); the inequality follows from the
convexity of `, and the equality obtains because `(r) − `(1 − r) ≤ 0 for r ∈ [0, 12 ], which is
true because r 7→ `(r) − `(1 − r) is convex on [0, 12 ] and equals 0 at the endpoints. Together
these claims yield (72).
Together, inequality (72), Jensen’s inequality, and inequality (70) imply that∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
(
`(λi j) − `(λ¯i j)
)
≥ −
∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
∣∣∣`(λi j) − `(λ¯i j)∣∣∣
≥
∑
i∈A
∑
j,i
ˆ`(|λi j − λ¯i j|)
≥ (n2 − n) ˆ`
∑i∈A ∑ j,i |λi j − λ¯i j|n2 − n

≥ (n2 − n) ˆ`
(
3
n2−nλ[K]
)
.
Finally, display (69) implies that d0 = λ0− λ¯0 ∈ [−2λ[K], 0]. Since ` : [0, 1]→ R is convex
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with `(1) = 0 and `′(1) = 1, it follows that
`(λ0) − `(λ¯0) ≥ `(1 + d0) − `(1) ≥ d0 ≥ −2λ[K].
Substituting three of the last four displays into (71), we obtain
R(λ||ν(·|x)) − R(λ¯||ν(·|x)) ≥ (n2 − n) ˆ`
(
3
n2−nλ[K]
)
+ λ[K]
(
log
ς5
x¯K
− 2
)
.
To complete the proof of the lemma, it is enough to show that if x¯K ≤ ς5e−2, then
(73) (n2 − n) ˆ`
(
3
n2−nλ[K]
)
+ λ[K]
(
log
ς5
x¯K
− 2
)
≥ −(n2 − n)
( x¯K
eς5
)1/3
.
We do so by computing the minimum value of the left-hand side of (73) over λ[K] ≥ 0. Let
a = n2 − n and c = log ς5x¯K − 2. The assumption that x¯K ≤ ς5e−2 then becomes c ≥ 0. Thus if
s > a3e , then
a ˆ`(3a s) + cs = −ae−1 + cs ≥ −ae−1 + c · a3e = a`(3a · a3e ) + c · a3e .
Thus if s ≤ a3e minimizes a`(3a s) + cs over s ≥ 0, it also minimizes a ˆ`(3a s) + cs, and the
minimized values are the same. To minimize a`(3a s)+cs, note that it is concave in s; solving
the first-order condition yields the minimizer, s∗ = a3 exp(− c3 − 1). This is less than or
equal to a3e when c ≥ 0. Plugging s∗ into the objective function yields −a exp(− c3 − 1), and
substituting in the values of a and c and simplifying yields the right-hand side of (73).
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.2.
7. Proof of Proposition 5.8
It remains to prove Proposition 5.8. Inequality (6) implies that solutions φ¯ to the mean
dynamic (10) satisfy
(74) ς − φ¯i ≤ ˙¯φi ≤ 1
for every action i ∈ A . Thus if (φ¯0)i ≤ ς2 , then for all t ∈ [0, ς4 ], the upper bound in (74)
yields (φ¯t)i ≤ 3ς4 . Then the lower bound yields ( ˙¯φt)i ≥ ς − 3ς4 = ς4 , and thus
(75) (φ¯0)i ≤ ς2 implies that (φ¯t)i − (φ¯0)i ≥ ς4 t for all t ∈ [0, ς4 ].
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In addition, it follows easily from (74) and (75) that solutions φ¯ of (10) from every initial
condition in X satisfy
(76) (φ¯t)i ≥ ς4 t for all t ∈ [0, ς4 ].
Fix φ ∈ Cx with cx(φ) < ∞, so that φ is absolutely continuous, with φ˙t ∈ Z at all t ∈ [0, 1]
where φ is differentiable. Let φ¯ ∈ Cx be the solution to (10) starting from x. Then for
α ∈ (0, ς4 ], define trajectory φα ∈ C˜x as follows
(77) φαt =
φ¯t if t ≤ α,φ¯α + (1 − 2ςα)(φt−α − x) if t > α.
Thus φα follows the solution to mean dynamic from x until time α; then, the increments
of φα starting at time α mimic those of φ starting at time 0, but are slightly scaled down.
The next lemma describes the key properties ofφα. In part (ii) and hereafter, | · | denotes
the `1 norm on Rn.
Lemma 7.1. If α ∈ (0, ς4 ] and t ∈ [α, 1], then
(i) φ˙αt = (1 − 2ςα)φ˙t−α.
(ii) |φαt − φt−α| ≤ (2 + 4ς )α.
(iii) for all i ∈ A , (φαt )i ≥ ς4α.
(iv) for all i ∈ A , (φαt )i ≥ ς12 (φt−α)i.
Proof. Part (i) is immediate. For part (ii), combine the facts that φ¯t and φt move at `1
speed at most 2 (since both have derivatives in Z) and the identity φt−α = φ0 + (φt−α − φ0)
with the definition of φαt to obtain∣∣∣φαt − φt−α∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣φ¯α − x∣∣∣ + 2ςα(φt−α − x) ≤ 2α + 2ςα · 2(t − α) ≤ (2 + 4ς )α.
We turn to part (iii). If (φt−α − x)i ≥ 0, then it is immediate from definition (77) and
inequality (76) that (φαt )i ≥ ς4α. So suppose instead that (φt−α − x)i < 0. Then (77) and the
fact that (φt−α)i ≥ 0 imply that
(78) (φαt )i ≥ (φ¯α)i − (1 − 2ςα)xi = ((φ¯α)i − xi) + 2ςαxi.
If xi ≤ ς2 , then (78) and (75) yield
(φαt )i ≥ ((φ¯α)i − xi) + 2ςαxi ≥ ς4α + 0 = ς4α.
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If xi ∈ [ς2 , ς], then (78) and (74) yield
(φαt )i ≥ ((φ¯α)i − xi) + 2ςαxi ≥ 0 + 2ςα · ς2 ≥ α.
And if xi ≥ ς, then (78), (74), and the fact that ˙¯φi ≥ −1 yield
(φαt )i ≥ ((φ¯α)i − xi) + 2ςαxi ≥ −α + 2ςα · ς ≥ α.
It remains to establish part (iv). If (φt−α)i = 0 there is nothing to prove. If (φt−α)i ∈ (0, 3α],
then part (iii) implies that
(φαt )i
(φt−α)i
≥
ς
4α
3α
=
ς
12
.
And if (φt−α)i ≥ 3α, then definition (77) and the facts that ˙¯φi ≥ −1 and α ≤ ς4 imply that
(φαt )i
(φt−α)i
≥ (φ¯α − x)i + (1 −
2
ςα)(φt−α)i +
2
ςαxi
(φt−α)i
≥ − α
3α
+ 1 − 2
ς
α ≥ 2
3
− 1
2
=
1
6
. 
Each trajectory φα is absolutely continuous, and Lemma 7.1(ii) and the fact that (10)
is bounded imply that φα converges uniformly to φ as α approaches 0. This uniform
convergence implies that
(79) lim
α→0 h(φ
α) = h(φ).
Since φα[0,α] is a solution to (10), and thus has cost zero, it follows from Lemma 7.1(i) and
the convexity of L(x, ·) that
cx(φα) =
∫ 1
α
L(φαt , φ˙
α
t ) dt
≤
∫ 1
α
L(φαt , φ˙t−α) dt +
∫ 1
α
2
ςα
(
L(φαt , 0) − L(φαt , φ˙t−α)
)
dt.(80)
To handle the second integral in (80), fix t ∈ [α, 1]. Since φαt ∈ int(X), ν(·|φαt ) has support
Z, a set with extreme points ext(Z) = {e j − ei : j , i} = Z r {0}. Therefore, the convexity of
L(x, ·), the final equality in (31), the lower bound (6), and Lemma 7.1(iii) imply that for all
z ∈ Z,
L(φαt , z) ≤ max
i∈A
max
j,i
L(φαt , e j − ei) ≤ −log
(
ςmin
i∈A
(φαt )i
)
≤ −log ς24 α.
–44–
Thus since L is nonnegative and since limα→0 α logα = 0, the second integrand in (80)
converges uniformly to zero, and so
(81) lim
α→0
∫ 1
α
2
ςα
(
L(φαt , 0) − L(φαt , φ˙t−α)
)
dt = 0.
To bound the first integral in (80), note first that by representation (14), for each t ∈ [0, 1]
there is a probability measure λt ∈ ∆(Z) with λt  ν(·|φt) such that
L(φt, φ˙t) = R(λt||ν(·|φt)) and(82)
L(φαt+α, φ˙t) ≤ R(λt||ν(·|φαt+α)) for all α ∈ (0, 1].(83)
DE Lemma 6.2.3 ensures that {λt}t∈[0,1] can be chosen to be a measurable function of t.
(Here and below, we ignore the measure zero set on which either φ˙t is undefined or
L(φt, φ˙t) = ∞.)
Lemma 7.2 and expressions (82) and (83) imply that
lim sup
α→0
∫ 1
α
L(φαt , φ˙t−α) dt = lim sup
α→0
∫ 1−α
0
L(φαt+α, φ˙t) dt
≤ lim sup
α→0
(∫ 1−α
0
R(λt||ν(·|φαt+α)) dt +
∫ 1
1−α
0 dt
)
=
∫ 1
0
R(λt||ν(·|φt)) dt
=
∫ 1
0
L(φt, φ˙t) dt
= cx(φ),
where the third line follows from the dominated convergence theorem and Lemma 7.2
below. Combining this inequality with (79), (80), and (81), we see that
inf
φ∈C ◦
(
cx(φ) − h(φ)
)
≤ lim sup
α→0
(
cx(φα) − h(φα)
)
≤ cx(φ) − h(φ).
Since φ ∈ C was arbitrary, the result follows.
It remains to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 7.2. Write Rαt+α = R(λt||ν(·|φαt+α)) and Rt = R(λt||ν(·|φt)). Then
(i) for all t ∈ [0, 1), limα→0 Rαt+α = Rt;
(ii) for all α > 0 small enough and t ∈ [0, 1 − α], Rαt+α ≤ Rt + log 12ς + 1.
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Proof. Definition (7) implies that
Rαt+α − Rt =
∑
z∈Z(φt)
λt(z) log
ν(z |φt)
ν(z |φαt+α)
(84)
=
∑
i∈supp(φt)
∑
j∈Ar{i}
λt(e j − ei)
(
log
(φt)i
(φαt+α)i
+ log
σi j(φt)
σi j(φαt+α)
)
+ λt(0) log
∑
i∈A (φt)iσii(φt)∑
i∈A (φαt+α)iσii(φ
α
t+α)
.
The uniform convergence from Lemma 7.1(ii) and the continuity of σ imply that for
each t ∈ [0, 1), the denominators of the fractions in (84) converge to their numerators as
α vanishes, implying statement (i). The lower bound (6) then implies that the second
and third logarithms in (84) themselves converge uniformly to zero as α vanishes; in
particular, for α small enough and all t ∈ [0, 1 − α], these logarithms are bounded above
by 1. Moreover, Lemma 7.1(iv) implies that when α is small enough and t ∈ [0, 1 − α]
is such that i ∈ supp(φt), the first logarithm is bounded above by log 12ς . Together these
claims imply statement (ii). This completes the proof of the lemma, and hence the proof
of Proposition 5.8.
8. Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Section 4
In the analyses in this section, we are often interested in the action of a function’s
derivative in directions z ∈ Rn0 that are tangent to the simplex. With this in mind, we let
1 ∈ Rn be the vector of ones, and let P = I − 1n11′ be the matrix that orthogonally projects
Rn onto Rn0 . Given a function g : R
n → R, we define the gradient of g with respect to Rn0 by
∇0g(x) = P∇g(x), so that for z ∈ Rn0 , we have ∇g(x)′z = ∇g(x)′Pz = (P∇g(x))′z = ∇0g(x)′z.
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
It is immediate from the definition of Mη that Mη(pi) = Mη(Ppi) for all pi ∈ Rn, leading
us to introduce the notation M¯η ≡ Mη|Rn0 . Recalling that h(x) =
∑
k∈S xk log xk denotes the
negated entropy function, one can verify by direct substitution that
(85) M¯η : Rn0 → int(X) and η∇0h : int(X)→ Rn0 are inverse functions.
Now let xt ∈ int(X) and yt = Mη(F(xt)) = Mη(PF(xt)). Then display (85) implies that
η∇0h(yt) = PF(xt). Since f η(x) = η−1 f (x) − h(x), ∇ f (x) = F(x), and x˙t = Mη(F(xt)) − xt ∈ Rn0 ,
we can compute as follows:
d
dt f
η(xt) = ∇0 f η(x)′x˙t = (η−1PF(xt) − ∇0h(xt))′(Mη(F(xt)) − xt)
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= (∇0h(yt) − ∇0h(xt))′(yt − xt) ≤ 0,
strictly so whenever Mη(F(xt)) , xt, by the strict convexity of h. Since the boundary of X
is repelling under (23), the proof is complete. 
We now turn to Lemma 4.3 and subsequent claims. We start by stating the gen-
eralization of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (26). For each R ⊆ S with #R ≥ 2, let
XR = {x ∈ X : supp(x) ⊆ R}, and define f ηR : X→ R by
f ηR(x) = η
−1 f (x) −
∑
i∈R
xi log xi +
∑
j∈SrR
x j
 ,
respectively. Evidently,
(86) f ηR(x) = f
η(x) when supp(x) = R.
Our generalization of equation (26) is
(87) H(x,−∇ f ηR(x)) ≤ 0 when supp(x) = R,with equality if and only if R = S.
To use (86) and (87) to establish the upper bound c∗y ≤ − f η(y) for paths φ ∈ Cx∗[0,T],
φ(T) = y that include boundary segments, define St = supp(φt). At any time t at which φ
is differentiable, φ˙t is tangent to the face of X corresponding to St, and so (86) implies that
d
dt f
η(φt) = ∇ f ηSt(φt)′φ˙t. We therefore have
cx∗,T(φ) =
∫ T
0
sup
ut∈Rn0
(
u′tφ˙t −H(φt,ut)
)
dt ≥
∫ T
0
(
−∇ f ηSt(φt)′φ˙t −H(φt,−∇ f
η
St
(φt))
)
dt
≥
∫ T
0
−∇ f ηSt(φt)′φ˙t dt = f η(x∗) − f η(y) = − f η(y),(88)
establishing the lower bound.
Derivation of property (87).
Let x ∈ X have support R ⊆ S, #R ≥ 2. Then since P1 = 0,
(89) ∇0 f ηR(x) = P
η−1F(x) −∑
i∈R
ei(1 + log xi) −
∑
j∈SrR
e j
 = P
η−1F(x) −∑
i∈R
ei log xi
 .
Recalling definition (11) of H, letting ζx be a random variable with distribution ν(·|x), and
–47–
using the fact that P(e j − ei) = e j − ei, we compute as follows:
exp(H(x,−∇ f ηR(x))) = E exp(−∇ f ηR(x)′ζx)
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j,i
exp(−∇ f ηR(x)′(e j − ei))P(ζx = e j − ei) + P(ζx = 0)
=
∑
i∈R
∑
j∈Sr{i}
exp(−η−1F j(x) + η−1Fi(x) + log x j − log xi) xi
exp(η−1F j(x))∑
k∈S exp(η−1Fk(x))
+
∑
i∈S
xi
exp(η−1Fi(x))∑
k∈S exp(η−1Fk(x))
=
∑
i∈R
exp(η−1Fi(x))∑
k∈S exp(η−1Fk(x))
(1 − xi) +
∑
i∈R
exp(η−1Fi(x))∑
k∈S exp(η−1Fk(x))
xi
=
∑
i∈R exp(η−1Fi(x))∑
k∈S exp(η−1Fk(x))
.
Since the final expression equals 1 when R = S and is less than 1 when R ⊂ S, property
(87) follows. 
Derivation of equation (27).
Let x ∈ int(X), and observe that
(90)
∂H
∂ui
(x,u) =
∑
j,i
(
exp(ui − u j)x j exp(η−1Fi(x)) − exp(u j − ui)xi exp(η−1F j(x))
)
E exp(u′ζx)
∑
k∈S exp(η−1Fk(x))
.
Recall from the previous derivation that E exp(−∇ f η(x)′ζx) = 1. Thus since ui − u j =
(ei − e j)′u = (P(ei − e j))′u, it follows from (90) that ∂H∂ui (x,u) = ∂H∂ui (x,Pu), so we can use
equation (89) with R = S to compute as follows:
∂H
∂ui
(x,−∇ f η(x)) = ∂H
∂ui
(x,−∇0 f η(x))
=
1∑
k∈A
exp(η−1Fk(x))
∑
j,i
(
exp(−η−1Fi(x) + η−1F j(x) + log xi − log x j) x j exp(η−1Fi(x))
− exp(−η−1F j(x) + η−1Fi(x) + log x j − log xi) xi exp(η−1F j(x))
)
=
1∑
k∈A
exp(η−1Fk(x))
∑
j,i
(
xi exp(η−1F j(x)) − x j exp(η−1Fi(x))
)
= xi
∑
j,i exp(η−1F j(x))∑
k∈A exp(η−1Fk(x))
− (1 − xi) exp(η
−1Fi(x))∑
k∈A exp(η−1Fk(x))
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= xi(1 −Mηi (F(x))) − (1 − xi)Mηi (F(x))
= xi −Mηi (F(x)). 
9. Additional Details
9.1 Proof of the Laplace principle upper bound: further details
Here we give a detailed proof of the Laplace principle upper bound. The argument
follows DE Section 6.2.
By equation (47), and the remarks that follow it, there is an optimal control sequence
{λNk }N−1k=0 that attains the infimum in (47):
(91) VN(xN) = ExN
(∫ 1
0
R(λ¯Nt || νN(· | ξ¯Nt )) dt + h(ξˆN)
)
.
The control measure ΛN and the interpolated processes ξˆN and ξ¯N induced by the control
sequence are defined in the previous section. Proposition 5.7 implies that there is a
random measure Λ and a random process ξ such that some subsubsequence of (ΛN, ξˆN, ξ¯N)
converges in distribution to (Λ, ξ, ξ). By the Skorokhod representation theorem, we can
assume without loss of generality that (ΛN, ξˆN, ξ¯N) converges almost surely to (Λ, ξ, ξ)
(again along the subsubsequence, which hereafter is fixed).
The next lemma establishes the uniform convergence of relative entropies generated
by the transition probabilities νN(·|x) of the stochastic evolutionary process.
Lemma 9.1. For each N ≥ N0, let λN : X N → ∆(Z) be a transition kernel satisfying λN(·|x) 
νN(·|x) for all x ∈ X N. Then
lim
N→∞maxx∈XN
∣∣∣∣R (λN(·|x) ||νN(·|x)) − R (λN(·|x) ||ν(·|x))∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Proof. Definitions (4) and (7) imply that
(92)
R
(
λN(·|x) ||ν(·|x)
)
− R
(
λN(·|x) ||νN(·|x)
)
=
∑
z∈Z(x)
λN(z |x) log ν
N(z |x)
ν(z |x)
=
∑
i∈supp(x)
∑
j∈Sr{i}
λN(e j − ei|x) log
σNij (x)
σi j(x)
+ λN(0|x) log
∑
i∈supp(x) xiσNii (x)∑
i∈supp(x) xiσii(x)
.
By the uniform convergence in (5), there is a vanishing sequence {εN} such that
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max
x∈XN
max
i, j∈S
|σNij (x) − σi j(x)| ≤ εN.
This inequality, the lower bound (6), and display (92) imply that for each z ∈ Z(x) and
x ∈ X N, we can write
log
νN(z |x)
ν(z |x) = log
(
1 +
εN(x, z)
ς(x, z)
)
,
where |εN(x, z)| ≤ εN and ς(x, z) ≥ ς. This fact and display (92) imply the result. 
To proceed, we introduce a more general definition of relative entropy and an ad-
ditional lemma. For α, β ∈ P (Z × [0, 1]) with β  α, let dβdα : Z × [0, 1] → R+ be the
Radon-Nikodym derivative of β with respect to α. The relative entropy of β with respect to
α is defined by
R (β||α) =
∫
Z×[0,1]
log
(
dβ
dα
(z , t)
)
dβ(z , t).
We then have the following lemma (DE Theorem 1.4.3(f)):
Lemma 9.2. Let {pit}t∈[0,1], {pˆit}t∈[0,1] with pit, pˆit ∈ ∆(Z) be Lebesgue measurable in t, and suppose
that pˆit  pit for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then
(93) R (pˆit ⊗ dt ||pit ⊗ dt) =
∫ 1
0
R(pˆit ||pit) dt.
This result is an instance of the chain rule for relative entropy, which expresses the relative
entropy of two probability measures on a product space as the sum of two terms: the
expected relative entropy of the conditional distributions of the first component given the
second, and the relative entropy of the marginal distributions of the second component (see
DE Theorem C.3.1). In Lemma 9.2, the marginal distributions of the second component
are both Lebesgue measure; thus the second summand is zero, yielding formula (93).
We now return to the main line of argument. For a measurable function φ : [0, 1]→ X,
define the collection {νφt }t∈[0,1] of measures in ∆(Z) by
(94) νφt (z) = ν(z |φt).
Focusing still on the subsubsequence from Proposition 5.7, we begin our computation
as follows:
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lim inf
N→∞ V
N(xN) = lim inf
N→∞ Ex
N
(∫ 1
0
R
(
λ¯Nt ||νN(·|ξ¯Nt )
)
dt + h(ξˆN)
)
= lim inf
N→∞ Ex
N
(∫ 1
0
R
(
λ¯Nt ||ν(·|ξ¯Nt )
)
dt + h(ξˆN)
)
= lim inf
N→∞ Ex
N
(
R (λ¯Nt ⊗ dt || ν ξ¯Nt ⊗ dt) + h(ξˆN)
)
The first line is equation (91). The second line follows from Lemma 9.1, using Observation
5.5 to show that the optimal control sequence {λNk } satisfies λNk ( · |x0, . . . , xk)  νN(·|xk) for
all (x0, . . . , xk) ∈ (X N)k+1 and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,N − 1}. The third line follows from equation
(94) and Lemma 9.2.
We specified above that (ΛN = λ¯Nt ⊗ dt, ξˆN, ξ¯N) converges almost surely to (Λ = λt ⊗
dt, ξ, ξ) in the topology of weak convergence, the topology of uniform convergence, and
the Skorokhod topology, respectively. The last of these implies that ξ¯N also converges to
ξ almost surely in the uniform topology (DE Theorem A.6.5(c)). Thus, since x 7→ ν(·|x) is
continuous, νξ¯Nt converges weakly to ν
ξ
t for all t ∈ [0, 1] with probability one. This implies
in turn that ν ξ¯Nt ⊗ dt converges weakly to νξt ⊗ dt with probability one (DE Theorem A.5.8).
Finally, R is lower semicontinuous (DE Lemma 1.4.3(b)) and h is continuous. Thus DE
Theorem A.3.13(b), an extension of Fatou’s lemma, yields
lim inf
N→∞ Ex
N
(
R (λ¯Nt ⊗ dt || ν ξ¯Nt ⊗ dt) + h(ξˆN)
)
≥ Ex
(
R (λt ⊗ dt || νξt ⊗ dt) + h(ξ)
)
.
To conclude, we argue as follows:
lim inf
N→∞ V
N(xN) ≥ Ex
(
R (λt ⊗ dt || νξt ⊗ dt) + h(ξ)
)
= Ex
(∫ 1
0
R
(
λt ||ν(·|ξt)
)
dt + h(ξ)
)
≥ Ex
∫ 1
0
L
ξt,∑
z∈Z
zλt(z)
 dt + h(ξ)

= Ex
(∫ 1
0
L(ξt, ξ˙t) dt + h(ξ)
)
≥ inf
φ∈C
(
cx(φ) + h(φ)
)
.
Here the second line follows from equation (94) and Lemma 9.2, the third from represen-
tation (14), the fourth from Proposition 5.7(iii), and the fifth from the definition (15) of the
cost function cx.
Since every subsequence has a subsequence that satisfies the last string of inequalities,
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the sequence as a whole must satisfy the string of inequalities. This establishes the upper
bound (37a).
9.2 Proof of Proposition 5.9
Finally, we prove Proposition 5.9, adding only minor modifications to the proof of DE
Lemma 6.5.5.
Fix an α > 0 and an absolutely continuous path φα ∈ C˜ such that φα[0,α] solves (10) and
φα[α,1] ⊂ int(X). For β ∈ (0, 1) with 1β ∈ N, we define the path φβ ∈ C ∗ as follows: On [0, α],
φβ agrees with φα. If k ∈ Z+ satisfies α + (k + 1)β ≤ 1, then for t ∈ (α + kβ, α + (k + 1)β], we
define the derivative φ˙βt by
φ˙βt =
1
β
∫ α+(k+1)β
α+kβ
φ˙αs ds
=
1
β
(φαα+(k+1)β − φαα+kβ).(95)
Similarly, if there is an ` ∈ Z+ such that α+ `β < 1 < α+ (` + 1)β, then for t ∈ (α+ `β, 1] we
set φ˙βt =
1
1−(α+`β) (φ
α
1 − φαα+`β). Evidently, φβ ∈ C ∗, and because φα is absolutely continuous,
applying the definition of the derivative to expression (95) shows that
lim
β→0 φ˙
β
t = φ˙
α
t for almost every t ∈ [0, 1].
We now prove that φβ converges uniformly to φα. To start, note that φβkβ = φ
α
t if
t ∈ [0, α], if t = α+ kβ ≤ 1, or if t = 1. To handle the in-between times, fix δ > 0, and choose
β small enough that |φαt − φαs | ≤ δ2 whenever |t − s| ≤ β. If t ∈ (kβ, (k + 1)β), then
|φβt − φαt | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t
kβ
(φ˙βs − φ˙αs ) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ t − kββ ∣∣∣∣φα(k+1)β − φαkβ∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣φαt − φαkβ∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
A similar argument shows that |φβt −φαt | ≤ δ if t ∈ (α+ `β, 1). Since δ > 0 was arbitrary, we
have established the claim.
Since h is continuous, the uniform convergence of φβ to φα implies that limβ→0 h(φβ) =
h(φα). Moreover, this uniform convergence, the convergence of the Z-valued functions
φ˙β to φ˙α, the fact that φα[α,1] ⊂ int(X), the continuity (and hence uniform continuity and
boundedness) of L(·, ·) on closed subsets of int(X) × Z (see Proposition 5.1(i)), and the
bounded convergence theorem imply that
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lim
β→0 cx(φ
β) = lim
β→0
(∫ α
0
L(φαt , φ˙
α
t ) dt +
∫ 1
α
L(φβt , φ˙
β
t ) dt
)
=
∫ 1
0
L(φαt , φ˙
α
t ) dt = cx(φ
α).
Since φα was an arbitrary absolutely continuous path in C˜ , the proof is complete. 
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